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This study of Transportation Security Administration’s Screening Passengers by 
Observation Techniques (SPOT) program analyzes the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
recommendations for improvement, as well as strengths and weaknesses of the 
program not specifically addressed in previous assessments. Any analysis of 
SPOT must be robust, as it represents one of the few threat agnostic 
countermeasures not limited by technology and finite detection capabilities.  
The GAO has recommended Congress withhold funding from SPOT until 
further evidence of effectiveness can be produced. The first portion of this study 
revisits the analysis of GAO and OIG in their respective reports. The GAO audits 
rely on meta-analyses that suggest human lie detection is no more successful 
than flipping a coin. This study assesses those claims, and reveals some 
contextual and analytical limitations of the claims. The OIG report offers similar 
claims, but adds additional insight into critical strategic areas.  
The second portion of this study focuses on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the SPOT program, including an analysis of several GAO and 
OIG conclusions. Many of the recommendations were operational in nature, and 
provided little strategic direction to improve the relevance, effectiveness, and 
credibility of the program. Analyzing strengths and weaknesses provides insight 
into more strategic recommendations that may improve the security value of 
SPOT. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Screening Passengers by 
Observation Techniques (SPOT) program is under intense scrutiny by Congress, 
and in danger of losing funding. Recent reports by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Office of Inspector General (OIG) have identified several areas for operational 
improvement, but the overarching question that needs to be answered is whether 
the program adds security value. The TSA must prove the program is effective 
before it will receive additional funding for the program. The practice of using 
behavioral cues to identify criminals or terrorists is in regular practice by many 
law enforcement and government agencies, but none is as visible as TSA’s 
dedicated workforce operating in a public airport environment. This study 
examines the literature available on deception detection, as well as the strengths 
and weaknesses of SPOT to determine if the program should continue to be 
funded.  
To date, several congressional hearings have been held on the topic, to 
include testimonies from the GAO, DHS OIG, DHS Behavioral Sciences Division, 
and TSA. GAO and DHS/TSA disagree as to whether the techniques work. Both 
are able to cite relevant academic and scientific literature supporting their 
respective arguments, which places the debate firmly in gridlock. Unfortunately, 
discussions in these “official” environments (hearings, etc.) tend to serve only as 
a forum for each party to state their case and “double down” on their original 
stance, which results in little progress being achieved toward a consensus. 
An examination of the literature reveals that this gridlock is not unique to 
the GAO and TSA. The academic community is also divided as to whether 
deception detection techniques are viable. The division is based on the debate of 
whether lab studies using trivial lies and unmotivated liars are indicative of real-
life performance. The studies are also focused specifically on lie detection, 
whereas SPOT uses a sequential combination of observation, situational 
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awareness, logical analysis, and deception detection techniques to determine if a 
person requires additional screening. The decision is based on the totality of 
circumstances, rather than a single structured lie detection interview. Only a 
single study, conducted by the DSH Behavioral Science Division, used the 
entirety of SPOT techniques, and the results indicated that SPOT is nine times, 
or 900 percent more effective than randomly selecting individuals.1 
Areas in which the literature is in general agreement are: 1) verbal and 
non-verbal cues to deception do exist, 2) no “Pinocchio’s nose” telltale indicator 
of deception exists, 3) deception can be easier or more difficult to detect 
depending on the skill of the liar, 4) high-stakes lies may be easier to detect than 
trivial lies due to the powerful emotions associated with a motivated lie, but are 
not simply escalated versions of traditional cues, 5) cues to deception may be 
more evident during personal lies, 6) lie catchers can be trained to elicit 
indicators from liars by increasing their cognitive load, and 7) more research in 
the field is necessary. Particularly, additional research in the field of high-stakes 
lies is necessary, as it is in its infancy compared to general laboratory deception 
detection using trivial lies.2 
Examination of the strengths and weaknesses of SPOT reveals that 
although SPOT has removed many criminals and dangerous prohibited items 
from the “transportation system,” areas exist in which strategic improvement can 
improve security value and efficiency of the program. SPOT has the benefit of 
being flexible, as the officers are a countermeasure that can be rapidly deployed 
to a variety of locations and activities. Additionally, SPOT is threat agnostic, and 
is designed to detect an individual with malicious intent, versus a specific, limited 
1 Behavioral Science and Security: Evaluating TSA’s SPOT (Screening of Passengers by 
Observational Techniques) Program: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and 
Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 111th Cong. (2011) (statement of 
Larry Willis), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/04/05/testimony-mr-larry-willis-program-manager-
science-and-technology-directorate. 
2 Stephen Porter and Leanne Brinke, “The Truth About Lies: What Works in Detecting High-
stakes Deception?,” Legal and Criminological Psychology 15, no. 1 (2010): 60, accessed 
September 3, 2014, doi: 10.1348/135532509X433151. 
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set of explosive types or weapons. SPOT also provides a great deterrent to U.S. 
adversaries, as it is difficult for an adversary to understand what will happen 
during an interaction with a SPOT officer, and how to counteract it. Despite these 
positive attributes, no efforts have been made since SPOT’s implementation to 
improve the program’s strategic direction or identify and implement process 
improvements. The GAO and OIG noted many of SPOT program issues as 
operational improvements, but strategic improvements can also increase SPOT’s 
security value, efficiency, and accountability. Examination of the documentation, 
as well as audit reports, reveals that SPOT has poor selection and hiring 
practices, inconsistent training and insufficient training, and a lack of 
accountability metrics.  
This study concludes that the literature regarding deception detection is 
limited concerning the ability to reproduce true high-stakes conditions in a 
laboratory study, and therefore, is not directly applicable to SPOT or other 
deception detection countermeasures. While the lab studies are a good first step, 
more research is needed to inform high-stakes deception detection, particularly 
in the context of terrorism. It is also not advisable to base program funding 
recommendations on meta-analyses conducted using trivial lies and psychology 
students as participants. Additional research is also needed in the area of “truth 
wizards” to determine what psychometric (or other) attributes are relevant to a 
successful deception detection practitioner.  
In the area of strategic improvements to the existing program, this study 
recommends that the TSA invest in substantial analysis and commit to revising 
the program based on the best available information. This study concludes that 
the TSA should undertake a strategic revamping of the program to include the 
following.  
• Establish an operational baseline performance metric for existing 
behavior detection officers (BDOs) using arrests/prohibited item-to-
referral ratio.  
• Develop hiring criteria based on a study of psychometric and other 
attributes of high performing BDOs.  
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• Place additional hiring emphasis on candidates possessing
program-enhancing characteristics, such as language skills and
cultural competency/background.
• Conduct all SPOT training at the federal law enforcement training
center (FLETC) using established procedures.
• Revising SPOT curriculum to include an explanation of TSA
authority, cultural, political, and socioeconomic variables that affect
a person’s behavior, and how personal biases affect response to
those variables.
• Offering advanced training classes in areas that will add value at
the checkpoint, as well as offering career advancement
opportunities for the BDOs (by collecting and demonstrating
proficiency in advanced training areas).
• Collaborating with agencies’ training spy craft or undercover
techniques to test the BDOs covertly or overtly.
While academia continues to advance the precision and relevance in 
which deception detection is studied and assessed, SPOT can make incremental 
gains in effectiveness, efficiency, and understanding of performance, even in lieu 
of established academic performance indicators. These strategic 
recommendations will provide valuable improvements and defensibility to SPOT, 
as will continued evolution of the program based on relevant research. In fact, 
the TSA has the opportunity to be a contributor to the body of scientific research 
that exists on the topic.  
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On December 14, 1999, an Islamic terrorist named Ahmed Ressem 
attempted to enter the United States from the Canadian border with a trunk full of 
explosives. The explosive materials were intended for a terrorist attack against 
the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), but the attack would never occur. 
While crossing over from Victoria British Columbia to Port Angeles, Washington, 
a United States (U.S.) immigration inspector noticed that Ressem’s response to 
his standard questions did not make sense. He stated he was going to Seattle for 
a 2-day business trip. The response was peculiar for two reasons, 1) the 
inspector had not asked him why he was going to Seattle, and 2) it would not 
make sense for a non-tourist to take this route to Seattle. Something was not 
right. Wants and warrants returned nothing, Ressem’s baggage was cleared, and 
he was sent on his way. At the arrival end of the ferry, Ressem was again subject 
to routine interaction with another U.S. immigration inspector. This time the 
inspector noticed him fidgeting, acting jittery, and sweating during routine 
questioning. This inspector also knew something was not right, and ultimately, 
searched the car and found explosives intended for the attack on LAX. While 
several attacks have been thwarted through investigations, this one stands out 
as being thwarted in progress using existing countermeasures. While intelligence 
and investigating has provided the greatest anti-terrorism success, it can fall 
short in the area of homegrown violent extremists or sympathizers not directly 
affiliated with a known terrorist group. The shift of the terrorist landscape to more 
one-off attacks or plots reminds everyone of the importance of real-time 
countermeasures. The countermeasure in this case was a routine passenger 
engagement by inspectors, who have been trained to detect unusual behaviors in 
the context of their post. Both inspectors noticed the unusual behavior of 
Ressem, such as his inability to provide consistent explanations for his travel, his 
nervousness, twitching, and sweating; behaviors that can be linked to a “fear of 
discovery” by criminals or terrorists. Their suspicion led to additional screening 
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and the discovery of the explosives that ultimately thwarted the planned attack on 
LAX. Real time threat assessment by the officers (using principles of behavior 
detection) is responsible for the only terrorist attack thwarted in progress by a 
U.S. government countermeasure. Ressem attempted to cover all his bases, 
including a cover story, and fake ID that did not arouse suspicion; however, he 
was not able to suppress his fear of discovery.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Screening Passengers 
by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program was established to create a threat 
agnostic, non-technology based countermeasure capable of identifying a 
malicious person rather than a specific type of threat item, such as an improvised 
explosive device (IED), a gun, or other threat object. Being able to identify 
terrorists by their pre-event behavior, regardless of the threat type or event 
planned, breaks the cycle of traditional, reactive game theoretic responses. 
Without threat agnostic layers, the TSA would solely rely on technology-based 
layers that are only effective against a specific type of threat. For example, red 
team (adversary) attempts to use a shoe IED against an aircraft, blue team (TSA) 
X-rays all shoes or red team uses IEDs concealed on a person, blue team 
purchases and implements body scanners. This reactive cycle typically keeps the 
blue team guessing, and at risk of a new style of attack. SPOT was implemented 
to give the TSA a real-time, threat-agnostic layer capable of identifying persons 
with malintent, regardless of what type of threat—explosive or contraband—they 
may be carrying. Game theorists would call it “disruptive technology” and 
operates outside the parameters of the “game.” With the exception of the 
important intelligence-based layers (which are not necessarily real time), the TSA 
layers listed in Figure 1 include mainly countermeasures designed to detect 
things versus terrorists. 
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Figure 1.  TSA Layers of Security1 
Although the SPOT program is the only real time, threat agnostic layer in 
TSA’s layers of countermeasures, it is currently in jeopardy of being cut by 
Congress, or at a minimum, receiving limited or reduced funding. In the last two 
years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) have criticized TSA’s SPOT program for lack of 
effectiveness evidence, poor training consistency, operational issues, and a lack 
of strategy. These criticisms correlate to two major areas, a perceived gap in the 
validity of behavior detection, and the development and management of the 
program. Many of the criticisms were valid operational concerns, and are already 
being addressed in response to GAO’s and OIG’s recommendations. For 
example, improving data entry after an incident is a valid operational criticism, 
which is easily addressed and will undeniably improve the program. While an 
important improvement, it does not impact the program’s future direction, 
1 “Layers of Security,” last modified July 23, 2014, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/layers-
security. 
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effectiveness, or credibility, but rather falls in the category of operational 
improvement versus strategic game-changer. During this period of scrutiny, the 
TSA should endeavor to make real strategic enhancements to the effectiveness 
of behavior detection in an aviation security context. With nearly 3,000 behavior 
detection officers (BDOS) and an approximate $200 million annual budget, the 
TSA owes it to the taxpayers to ensure SPOT is continually improving and 
providing added value to transportation security.  
Contributing to the GAO’s criticisms are the general lack of concurrence 
amongst behavioral science professionals, allegations of profiling, lack of 
multitasking ability, and general lack of knowledge about the current threat 
environment and the value of deterrence. The GAO audits contend that not 
enough is known about the science of behavior detection to assert its 
effectiveness; however, little disagreement exists that people will exhibit signs of 
fear or anxiety during times of elevated stress. The disagreement is more about 
whether these signs are consistently detectable through interaction with the 
subject. A number of scientific studies and practical publications support the 
validity of the practice, including an independent evaluation by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) that found the practice to be much more effective than 
random selection.  
Many federal and law enforcement agencies, such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the United 
States Secret Service (USSS), have been utilizing these concepts for years. The 
principles for the TSA version of behavior detection are based on the Israeli 
model, as well as research from Dr. Paul Ekman, who pioneered the study of 
non-verbal communication as it relates to deception detection. Those who 
practice SPOT or similar programs are sometimes referred to as human lie 
detectors; a bit parochial and oversimplified, but somewhat accurate. The use of 
behavior detection as a security countermeasure is based on the generally 
accepted universality of the seven defined human emotions. Many of the 
criticisms of SPOT seem to focus on a single aspect, such as human lie 
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detection through the recognition of micro-facial expressions, or other singular, 
controversial practice. Research about the program reveals that trained 
practitioners actually use a cadre of techniques to assess the totality of the 
existing circumstances. Practitioners use a combination of observation, casual 
conversation, directed conversation, and response evaluation (whether verbal or 
physiological) to evaluate whether a passenger is being deceptive, or is nervous, 
fearful, or uncomfortable for some other reason.  
The TSA still has to solve challenging problems, including how to begin 
measuring effectiveness for the program given that no actual terrorists have been 
caught as a result of SPOT. The only data available is the number of persons 
arrested at the airport for doing or possessing something illegal. Many success 
stories in this area has occurred; however, some argue that using arrest data 
only amounts to proxy data, and may not translate to success for catching a 
terrorist. It is also difficult to translate the number of criminal “catches” into 
effectiveness since it is not known how many were missed. For example, if 10 
drug mules are identified at an airport using behavior analysis, and 10 get 
through without being discovered, then there the probability of detection (P(d)) is 
50 percent. However, in reality it is not possible to know about the 10 that were 
missed Thus, it is also not possible to assign a P(d) or success rate confidently. It 
can be argued that since no aviation attacks have occurred on U.S. soil, then no 
terrorists with malintent have been missed. To that end, the largest unknown may 
be how to measure deterrence, and whether deterrence is responsible for the 
lack of terrorist attacks on the U.S. civil aviation system.  
The TSA is shifting to a layered, risk-based security approach, with an 
increase in reliance on intelligence information, and subsequently, applying 
technology resources strategically to have the most value in guarding against a 
potential attack. This shift is in part due to the acknowledgement that the federal 
government cannot develop and buy a new “scanner” for every type of potential 
threat, and therefore, it makes sense to provide additional focus on who is flying, 
not just what they are carrying. Without the real-time layer of screening for 
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“intent,” the traveling public will be reliant on a security system that relies heavily 
on automated technologies, which are limited to a finite (and potentially 
documented) detection capability. Due to the number of variables involved and 
the limitations of lab testing, it is not likely that the scientific community will soon 
reach a consensus about the effectiveness of behavior detection techniques. 
However, in lieu of a proven scientific method to measure and quantify the P(d), 
this study will attempt to determine if ways exist to improve the program based 
on the literature available, assess the GAO conclusions and analysis, determine 
if methods exist to begin measuring effectiveness using existing data, and offer 
additional strategic improvements to make SPOT viable and credible in a large-
scale aviation security context.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The science of behavior detection as an anti-terrorism technique is not 
well documented, yet many anti-terrorism organizations continue to practice and 
train in these techniques. State and local law enforcement agencies also train 
and practice similar techniques without criticism or question. The documentation 
that does exist is generally only focused on one aspect of behavior detection, 
such as human lie detection or non-verbal deception, but never the topic as a 
whole. Much of the existing documentation is controversial and can essentially 
be divided into two distinct opinions, recognized experts who validate the 
effectiveness of such practices, and those who believe the success of such 
practices is a myth. While the academic studies have mixed results, both 
supporters and detractors agree that the results are likely impacted by the 
inability to recreate conditions and genuine emotions, such as fear, stress, and 
anxiety associated with deception. The level of fear, stress, or anxiety is directly 
proportional to the consequence of being discovered. A trained observer can 
visually detect this fear or anxiety as it manifests through involuntary physical 
and/or physiological activity, including but not limited to increased heart rate, 
facial displays of emotion, changes in speed and direction of movement, or 
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nervous sweating.2 This inability to elicit genuine emotion during lab testing is not 
an insignificant limitation, as behavior detection techniques rely heavily on the 
indications of basic emotions.  
A large portion of the research around deception detection is primarily 
focused on “human lie detection” (quite different from SPOT) and consists 
primarily of academic publications, such as psychology textbooks, journals, and 
academic theses; but the research also includes legislation, congressional 
reports, news articles, and expert opinion. This literature review examines the 
scientific research on the topic, official government documentation, and best 
practices that may improve the state of the program.  
1. Scientific Research
Research of SPOT reveals that it is not singularly based on the ability to 
determine if a person is lying, but rather on the assessment of the totality of the 
existing circumstances including a person’s appearance (not related to race, 
religion, etc.), behavior, potential responses to questioning or casual 
conversation, and the validity of their responses compared with their travel plans 
and travel documentation. Only a single scientific study specifically about TSA 
SPOT exists and was an independent evaluation ordered by the DHS to 
determine the effectiveness of the practice (versus the science behind the 
practice); this study is discussed later under “official government documentation.” 
As no scientific studies cover the entire breadth of SPOT techniques, it is 
necessary to evaluate scientific evidence in similar areas, such as the 
universality of human emotion, intuition, human lie detection, and non-verbal 
communication. While these topics do overlap, and none of them independently 
could be said to validate or invalidate SPOT, the totality of their results may help 
inform the validity of the practice of SPOT.  
2 The TSA Spot Program: A Law Enforcement Perspective: Hearing before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations 
and Oversight, 111th Cong., 5 (2011) (statement of Detective Lieutenant Peter J. DiDomenica). 
7 
a. Emotion 
Determining whether people all portray the same indicators of emotion is 
important basis for evaluating a human being’s response to different 
circumstances. For example, if what westerners call “fear” manifested itself as 
happiness in different cultures, then observers would constantly be mistaking the 
intentions or responses of other cultures. According to psychologist Dr. David 
Matsumoto: 
Emotions are not just feelings. Emotion…..is one class of affective 
phenomenon. To me, emotions are transient, bio-psycho-social 
reactions designed to aid individuals in adapting to and coping with 
events that have implications for survival and well being. They are 
biological because they involve physiological responses from the 
nervous system, and prime skeletal muscle activities. They are 
psychological because they involve specific mental processes 
required for elicitation and regulation of response. And they are 
social because they are often elicited by social interactions, and 
have meaning with those interactions.3 
Psychologists generally agree that all people experience a few basic 
emotions, regardless of cultural background or geographic location (see  
Figure 2). Seven commonly accepted primary emotions are the following: 
enjoyment, surprise, fear, anger, contempt, disgust, and sadness as defined by 
Matsumoto.4 Psychologists debate whether five, six, or seven universal emotions 
exist, but they only differ by combining or extracting certain emotions. For 
example, some studies may list fear and surprise as a single expression, for a 
total of six universal emotions.5 More specifically, James Russell’s review of 
cross cultural emotion studies claims that modern research acknowledges that 
the face involuntarily reveals these basic emotions in all humans, regardless of 
origin.6 Modern research on the universality of emotion in general was pioneered 
3 David Matsumoto, “The Origin of Universal Human Emotions,” 1, October 18 2014, 
http://davidmatsumoto.com/content/NG%20Spain%20Article_2_.pdf.  
4 Ibid., 3. 
5 James Russell, “Is There Universal Recognition of Emotion From Facial Expressions? A 
Review of the Cross Cultural Studies,” Psychological Bulletin 115, no. 1 (1994): 102. 
6 Ibid. 
 8 
                                            
by Dr. Ekman’s Department of Defense funded non-verbal communication 
research in the 1960s.7 Since then, it has been widely accepted amongst 
psychologists and deception detection researchers (such as Matsumoto, 
DePaulo, and many others) that universality of emotion does exist, and automatic 
links between the emotion and facial expressions do occur.8 Psychologists who 
dispute the universality of human emotion are typically only referring to the 
tertiary, or more complex set of emotions not tied to survival, such as love, 
ambition, pride, self-respect, shame, guilt, inspiration, enthusiasm, sadness, awe, 
admiration, humility and humiliation, sense of justice and injustice, envy, malice, 
resentment, cruelty, hatred, etc.9 These emotions may be culturally specific or 
unique to certain cultures, particularly the west. The universality of basic or 
primary emotions and their associated facial expressions is strong support for 
deception detection being universal across cultures, as the fear of discovery 
should manifest itself similarly amongst all cultures. For example, an American 
should be able to detect deceptive behavior from a Japanese person based on 
the universality of basic emotions, and the fear of discovery associated with 
deceptive activity, such as terrorist or criminal activity.  
7 Paul Ekman, Emotions Revealed: How Recognizing Faces and Feelings Improves 
Communication and Emotional Life (New York: Times Books, 2003), 2. 
8 Russell, “Is There Universal Recognition of Emotion From Facial Expressions? A Review of 
the Cross Cultural Studies,” 102–103. 
9 Liah Greenfeld, “Are Human Emotions Universal?,” Psychology Today: Health, Help, 
Happiness + Find a Therapist, April 23, 2013. http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-modern-
mind/201304/are-human-emotions-universal.  
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Figure 2.  James Russell’s “Conclusions from Recent Reviews on the 
Universality Thesis”10 
b. Intuition  
The theory of “human lie detectors” is as fundamental as a mother’s 
intuition. Intuition may be better described as subconscious observation, 
perception, and subsequent response. For example, children who have been 
sneaking cookies are subconsciously displaying “indicators” to their mother that 
they have done something wrong, and their mother subconsciously knows 
10 Russell, “Is There Universal Recognition of Emotion From Facial Expressions? A Review 
of the Cross Cultural Studies,” 103. 
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something is different about the child’s behavior; thus, the “deception” is 
“detected.” This theory is supported in psychological circles as “listening with 
your eyes.”11 This capability is enhanced when baseline data is available as a 
mental comparison, as in the case of a mother and child. Other similar notions, 
such as being a “good judge of character,” or having good intuition, or having a 
gut feeling, support the validity of capabilities, such as deception detection, 
although they do not explain it. Recently scientists have begun to study intuition, 
and Carlin Flora explained it in Psychology Today: 
Intuitions, or gut feelings, are sudden, strong judgments whose 
origin we can’t immediately explain. Although they seem to emerge 
from an obscure inner force, they actually begin with a perception 
of something outside—a facial expression, a tone of voice, a visual 
inconsistency so fleeting you’re not even aware you noticed. Think 
of them as rapid cognition or condensed reasoning that takes 
advantage of the brain’s built-in shortcuts. Or think of intuition as an 
unconscious associative process. Long dismissed as magical or 
beneath the dignity of science, intuition turns out to muster some 
fancy and fast mental operations. The best explanation 
psychologists now offer is that intuition is a mental matching game. 
The brain takes in a situation, does a very quick search of its files, 
and then finds its best analogue among the stored sprawl of 
memories and knowledge. Based on that analogy, you ascribe 
meaning to the situation in front of you. A doctor might simply 
glance at a pallid young woman complaining of fatigue and 
shortness of breath and immediately intuit she suffers from 
anemia.12 
Flora continues to reference the research of Dr. Maureen O’Sullivan, which 
indicates that some people are naturally excellent at detecting deception, and 
that they have a strong interest in people in common, as well as a broad range of 
experience to draw upon.13 Good deception detectors who have broad life 
experience also supports the notion that the brain is performing an instantaneous 
11 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking (New York, NY: Back 
Bay Books, 2007), 245–254. 




                                            
analysis based on the totality of circumstances, and matching those 
circumstances against other experiences and outcomes.  
c. Human Lie Detection 
“Decades of research has shown that people are poor at detecting lies.”14 
However, despite decades of research to the contrary, a plethora of books claim 
to teach how to become a human lie detector, many written by psychologists, 
former spies, or government agents. It has been indicated that the science is 
used and accepted by practitioners and operators, as is the number of legitimate 
agencies and organizations that have resources dedicated to deception 
detection. Of course, some academic research supports the notion of human lie 
detectors, and much of the literature that acknowledges these capabilities, also 
claims some persons have a predisposed ability to catch liars, which indicates it 
may be possible to choose candidates with those characteristics.15 Other studies 
question whether these indicators even exist, and claim that the effectiveness of 
human deception detection is barely better than a coin flip.16 One comprehensive 
meta-analysis by Hartwig and Bond Jr. set out to determine “why lie catchers fail” 
by offering the hypothesis that they rely on inaccurate cues to deception, but 
instead, they found that lie catchers, when successful, were actually relying on 
intuitive and accurate cues to deception, even though they were not able to 
articulate initially why they caught the liar. The conclusion was that lie catchers 
do not need training on objective cues to deception, as they are intuitively using 
14 Maria Hartwig and Charles F. Bond, “Why Do Lie-catchers Fail? A Lens Model Meta-
analysis of Human Lie Judgments,” Psychological Bulletin 137, no. 4 (2011): 643, doi: 
10.1037/a0023589. 
15 Mark G. Frank, Melissa A. Menasco, and Maureen O’Sullivan, “Human Behavior and 
Deception Detection,” in Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security, vol. 5 
(John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 5, sec. 2, accessed September 1, 2013, http://www.cl.cam.ac. 
uk/~rja14/shb10/frank2.pdf. 
16 United States Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 
Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives Aviation 
Security: TSA Should Limit Future Funding for Behavior Detection, Statement of Stephen M. 
Lord, Director Homeland Security and Justice (GAO-14-158T) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2013), 3. 
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them already; but would benefit from training on techniques to elicit valid cues to 
deception from the liar.17  
d. Non-verbal Communication 
“The face is a dynamic canvas on which emotions and intentions are 
communicated, and is scrutinized during all social interactions.”18 Aldert Vrij 
published Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities, which is widely 
regarded as the most comprehensive study of deception detection. In this book, 
Vrij offers an explanation of why deception detection is so difficult, and explains 
why non-verbal cues to deception are dependent on the liar’s personality and the 
situation. Vrij’s explanation includes Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal’s multi-
factor model, which indicates a liar’s non-verbal behavior is dependent on 
whether the liar is emotional, under a high cognitive load (trying to keep his story 
straight), or attempting to control his behaviors.19 For example, an emotional liar 
(such as a lone-wolf terrorist attempting to conduct an attack) may exhibit 
traditionally accepted signs of deception, such as nervousness, gaze aversion, 
fidgeting, speech errors, voice pitch change, etc., that are associated with 
emotions, such as fear, guilt, and excitement.20 A liar under high cognitive load 
(such as an Al-Qaeda foot soldier of moderate capability carrying out an order, 
using a rehearsed story) may exhibit non-verbal indicators, such as thinking hard, 
slow responses, slow speech, limited detail, and long pauses, which are 
associated with the extra mental effort required to remember, tell, and defend a 
rehearsed lie.21 The third type of liar, individuals attempting to control their 
behaviors (such as a skilled insider threat with knowledge of the system) may 
17 Hartiwig and Bond, “Why Do Lie-catchers Fail? A Lens Model Meta-analysis of Human Lie 
Judgments,” 655–656.  
18 Stephen Porter and Leanne Brinke, “The Truth About Lies: What Works in Detecting High-
stakes Deception?,” Legal and Criminological Psychology 15, no. 1 (2010): 65, accessed 
September 3, 2014, doi: 10.1348/135532509X433151. 
19 Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities (Chichester: John Wiley, 
2008), 38. 
20 Ibid., 39. 
21 Ibid., 39–40. 
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exhibit indicators, such as overly focused gaze (eye contact) and lack of normal 
body movements, which makes them appear rigid, rehearsed, or lacking normal 
spontaneity.22 Vrij introduces the additional variable of the “liar’s personality,” 
which indicate that personality and skill can make liars less susceptible to fear, 
guilt, or excitement, and the associated indicators, making deception detection 
more difficult.23 Vrij’s book appears to offer an explanation as to why decades of 
research have yielded such varying results. Essentially, many of the traditional 
techniques and indicators have merit, but only if the lie catcher has the ability to 
categorize the “liar,” and only if the lie catcher is better than the liar.  
Additionally, Dr. Paul Ekman, who advised on the TSA SPOT program 
startup, has pioneered scientific research supporting the validity of deception 
detection. Dr. Ekman’s material contains extensive research into non-verbal 
communication, and test results with thousands of data points to include 
photographs and video of test subjects.24 It is widely acknowledged and 
documented in both the psychology and law enforcement communities that 
general, detectable behaviors do indicate deception. However, respected 
psychologists are divided as to whether humans can successfully detect and 
identify those behaviors. While it is well documented that cues of deception are 
weak at best during low stakes laboratory experiments, Porter and Brinke note 
that “facial expressions are of great relevance in betraying motivated lies 
because of the difficulty of faking genuine emotions and the involuntary nature of 
the expression of powerful concealed ones.”25 However, they also warn of over 
reliance on certain indicators, rather than relying on the totality of circumstances 
and the deviation from baseline. 
22 Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities, 41–43.  
23 Ibid., 43–46. 
24 Paul Ekman, “Lie Catching and Microexpressions,” in The Philosophy of Deception, ed. 
Clancy W. Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
25 Porter and Brinke, “The Truth About Lies: What Works in Detecting High-stakes 
Deception?,” 65. 
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A consistent criticism of lab research in this area is that the methodology 
of using mostly college students in laboratory experiments limits the validity of 
the study, as the students are not motivated or rewarded to lie successfully, and 
are not free to choose to tell a lie or truth.26 They simply follow the instructions 
given to them, which may not produce the same indicators of a real liar. 
Additionally, psychological studies in general are receiving criticism for using 
these often teen-aged college students as a representative sample of human 
behavior worldwide.27 Dr. John Grohol has cast doubt on the usefulness of the 
data provided by these limited studies, by stating, “the contribution to our real 
understanding of human behavior is increasingly being called into question.”28 
Additional limitations include the lack of high-stakes lies in deception detection 
deception studies. DePaulo et al., note that cues to deception are stronger when 
lies are about transgressions,29 which indicates that subjects forced to tell a lie of 
no consequence may not exhibit the same cues to deception as someone with a 
stake in the lie, which limits the usefulness of the study. A 2009 study by 
O’Sullivan and colleagues compiled results of deception detection conducted at 
31 different police departments, in eight countries, using high and low stakes lies. 
The high-stakes lies were detected at rate of 67.15 percent, while the low stakes 
lies were only detected at a rate of 55.17 percent.30 
Overall, the science of deception detection is well documented by 
psychologists and practitioners, although conclusive academic study results are 
difficult to obtain (due to small sample sizes of real incidents and difficulty in 
recreating genuine emotional reactions in a lab environment) and are divisive 
26 Bella M. Depaulo et al., “Cues to Deception,” Psychological Bulletin 129, no. 1 (2003): 
106, doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74. 
27 John Grohol, “Psychology Secrets: Most Psychology Studies Are College Student 




29 Depaulo et al., “Cues to Deception,” 74. 
30 Maureen O’Sullivan et al., “Police Lie Detection Accuracy: The Effect of Lie Scenario,” 
Law and Human Behavior 33, no. 6 (2009): 533, doi: 10.1007/s10979-008-9166-4. 
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across the range of literature. Furthermore, only general results are repeatable, 
and the test conditions vary greatly. The literature is in general agreement on 
several factors of deception detection: 1) verbal and non-verbal cues to 
deception do exist, 2) no “Pinocchio’s nose” telltale indicator of deception exists, 
3) deception can be easier or more difficult to detect depending on the skill of the 
liar, 4) high-stakes lies may be easier to detect than trivial lies due to the 
powerful emotions associated with a motivated lie, but are not simply escalated 
versions of traditional cues, 5) cues to deception may be more evident during 
personal lies, 6) lie catchers can be trained to elicit indicators from liars by 
increasing their cognitive load, and 7) more research in the field is necessary. 
Particularly, additional research in the field of high-stakes lies is necessary, as it 
is in its infancy compared to general laboratory deception detection using trivial 
lies.31 
2. Official Government Documentation 
Numerous official government documents provide insight into the 
background, performance, current state, and shortcomings of the behavior 
detection program, including GAO reports, congressional testimony, OIG reports, 
and official congressional testimony.  
a. Audits/Reports 
At least three official inquiries into the validity of the TSA SPOT program 
include two GAO audits and an OIG investigation. Both inquiries found similar 
issues with the program and provide a combined total of 17 recommendations for 
improvement to SPOT.  
31 Porter and Brinke, “The Truth About Lies: What Works in Detecting High-stakes 
Deception?,” 60. 
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The GAO has identified a number of valid recommendations that can be 
easily addressed by TSA.32 The initial 2010 report recommended an 
independent validation of the SPOT program to ensure it is based on valid 
scientific principles. A second follow up report was issued in 2013, which 
recommended limiting funding to SPOT based on the lack of evidence that the 
program is effective, and rebutted the independent validation study that the DHS 
conducted. While several of the recommendations are valid operational 
improvements, some of the conclusions appear to be based on incomplete data 
analysis or a lack of contextual knowledge about the data. The report recognizes 
the incomplete data at times, but auditors were forced to draw conclusions from a 
limited data set provided by the TSA. For example, the GAO notes the 
inconsistency of arrest rates across the country as suspect; however, it is 
unknown if more suspicious activity occurs in Boston than in Orlando, which 
explains the variation. On several occasions, the GAO notes a lack of 
appropriate data from the TSA, and without a more robust analysis, neither the 
TSA nor GAO will know the cause of the variation in arrest rates. The report 
notes several anecdotal success stories of SPOT, but again, the TSA did not 
have sufficient documentation to allow these stories to be considered in the 
analysis. The report uses the only data available as conclusive evidence of 
success, arrest data, when in fact arrest data is only useful in context and not as 
a singular measure of success (or failure). Furthermore, the report does not 
consider any measure of deterrence associated with the program. At times in the 
report, it seems as though the GAO does not believe or acknowledge that the 
science of behavior analysis is valid, and at other times, it appears it agrees with 
the science but not TSA’s execution of the program. Overall, the reports offer a 
light data analysis using the limited data provided, but the analysis could be 
improved with additional data and contextual background. The TSA data 
32 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate 
TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to 
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges (GAO-10-763) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010), 60–62, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10763.pdf. 
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analyzed in this thesis is contained within these GAO audit reports as well, and is 
assumed to be accurate.  
The GAO analysis is heavily reliant on a well-known deception detection 
meta-analysis that claims even the best human lie detectors are only slightly 
better than a coin toss at picking up the deception.33 However, as the premise of 
the science is that fear of discovery and the associated nervousness or anxiety 
causes uncontrollable physiological reactions or “indicators,” it is difficult to have 
confidence in compiled laboratory test results when it is difficult to reproduce the 
conditions of a real, motivated lie. In fact, one of the meta-analyses used by the 
GAO specifically identifies this factor as a limitation with the conclusion, “Perhaps 
liars in the majority of the laboratory research conducted so far are not facing 
enough of a challenge to give rise to valid behavioral differences. In most of 
these studies, people are asked to provide a statement with no risk of being 
challenged about particular details and no risk of being disproven by external 
information.”34 This test limitation minimizes the utility of scientific tests in this 
area due to the inability to induce the type of stress capable of eliciting the 
desired behavioral indicators artificially.  
These meta-analyses are strictly focused on deception detection during a 
structured interview or simple lie detection, which is not a direct correlation to 
SPOT, but offers general insight into the field. Unfortunately, limited studies of 
true high-stakes deception detection are available, and as such, many of the 
studies in the meta-analysis rely on psychology students as subjects and do not 
provide any training to either the “liar” or the “detector” in the test. While the 
meta-analysis itself may be valid for the purpose for which it was designed, it is 
not directly representative of the SPOT program and the conclusions do not 
33 United States Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 
Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives Aviation 
Security: TSA Should Limit Future Funding for Behavior Detection, Statement of Stephen M. 
Lord, Director Homeland Security and Justice, 3. 
34 Hartiwig and Bond, “Why Do Lie-catchers Fail? A Lens Model Meta-analysis of Human Lie 
Judgments,” 657. 
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appear to be sufficient to draw concrete conclusions about SPOT. Other meta-
analyses claiming positive test results address some of these limitations by first 
providing training; they claim that deception detection capability can be improved 
with training and proper candidate selection.35 Porter and Binke claim that a two-
day intensive training on verbal and non-verbal cues to deception improved a 
group of parole officers’ lie detection capability from 40.4 percent accuracy to 
76.7 percent accuracy. The GAO audit reports mentioned but did not expressly 
address the implication of using meta-analyses or the limitations of the test 
conditions within.  
The OIG also conducted a review of SPOT to determine the efficiency, 
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and objectivity of the program.36 The results of 
the OIG investigation produced similar operational concerns to the GAO audit, 
with a bit more focus on training. Several of their recommendations were related 
to accountability, and the focus was geared toward effectiveness and efficiency 
versus scientific validation. While crossover occurred between the two reports, 
the OIG did raise a particularly insightful topic, the selection of BDO personnel. 
The TSA lacks credibility in this area, as only transportation security officers 
(TSOs) are able to apply for the position. Attached to the document is TSA’s 
official response to the investigation, where they concur with most 
recommendations. Unfortunately, the TSA does not address the BDO selection 
process in the response.37 Additional TSA-provided data is contained in this 
report, used in this thesis, and assumed to be accurate.  
35 Julia Shaw, Stephen Porter, and Leanne Ten Brinke, “Catching Liars: Training Mental 
Health and Legal Professionals to Detect High-stakes Lies,” Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & 
Psychology 24, no. 2 (January 17, 2013): 2, doi: 10.1080/14789949.2012.752025. 
36 Office of Inspector General, Transportation Security Administration’s Screening of 
Passengers by Observation Techniques (Redacted) (OIG-13-91) (Washington, DC: Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013), 1.  
37 Ibid., 22–28. 
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b. Congressional Testimony 
These audits and reports resulted in an official Congressional hearing that 
revealed valuable insights from parties on both sides. Unfortunately, after several 
audits, and an independent validation study, disagreement still occurs as to 
whether the program is based on sound principles. Examination of both GAO 
reports and the associated congressional testimony reveal that the GAO is not 
against behavior detection, but is rather requiring the TSA to provide proof of 
effectiveness. In 2011, Mr. Larry Willis discussed the results of an independent 
validation study of SPOT (commissioned by the DHS). Although the report is not 
published for public consumption, his sworn testimony discussing the results 
states that SPOT is nine times, or 900 percent more effective than randomly 
selecting individuals.38 The latest GAO report claims the data set used is 
unreliable and that some of the test methodologies were flawed. The report 
claims that the database used for data collection can only record eight of the 94 
behaviors, six signs of deception, and four types of prohibited items. While true at 
the time, it does not appear to invalidate the overall results of the study.39 It may 
limit the usefulness of the data in determining which of the 94 observed 
behaviors are most used, but it does not invalidate the conclusion that the BDO-
selected population was found to have prohibited items nine times more often 
than randomly selected population. This conclusion is a point of contention 
between the GAO and DHS, as the DHS claims GAO’s analysis of the SPOT 
validation study led to misleading conclusions, and the GAO responds, “We 
disagree with this statement.”40 Although not a topic of this thesis, this never 
ending cycle seems to indicate that the required method of reviewing and 
responding to GAO audits in public documented forums is not conducive to 
38 Behavioral Science and Security: Evaluating TSA’s SPOT (Screening of Passengers by 
Observational Techniques) Program: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and 
Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight.  
39 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit 
Future Funding for Behavior Detection, 4–5. 
40 Ibid., 9. 
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program improvement, and leads to all parties doubling down on their previously 
documented opinions.  
The literature also contains testimony of TSA Administrator John Pistole 
defending the validation study, as well as the layered security concept that 
benefits from threat agnostic, non-technology based counter-measures.41 
Additional congressional testimony by TSA Deputy Administrator John Halinski 
describes the TSA’s move toward risk-based security, including a focus on 
training at the new TSA Academy operating in partnership with the federal law 
enforcement training center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA.42  
Outside sources also support the program, evident in Detective Lieutenant 
Peter J. DiDomenica’s statement before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.43 Although at times it appears 
his testimony is self-serving, he does defend the techniques associated with 
SPOT and makes common sense recommendations for the program. The 
testimony also highlights that SPOT authority was upheld by the Supreme 
Court’s decision that not all transportation modes are an inherent right of a U.S. 
citizen, which allow certain aspects of air travel to be regulated. Also of note, 
Congressional committee and sub-committee websites related to transportation 
and transportation security are months behind in posting documentation related 
to public hearings and Congressional testimony.  
41 Behavioral Science and Security: Evaluating TSA’s SPOT (Screening of Passengers by 
Observational Techniques) Program: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and 
Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 111th Cong. (2011) (statement of 
Larry Willis), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/04/05/testimony-mr-larry-willis-program-manager-
science-and-technology-directorate. 
42 Eleven Years After 9/11 Can TSA Evolve To Meet the Next Terrorist Threat?: Hearing 
before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Transportation Security, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of John Halinski). 
43 The TSA Spot Program: A Law Enforcement Perspective: Hearing before the U.S. House 
of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight.  
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c. Public Law 
To complete the literature review on any aviation security topic, include 
public law 107–71, the Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA) must be 
included.44 This public law was prompted by and enacted shortly after the 9/11 
tragedy and provides the basis for the legal obligations and allowances of the 
U.S. government as it relates to civil aviation security. The ATSA represents the 
creation of TSA and designates the authorities for screening U.S. mail, carry-on 
and checked aviation luggage, as well as aviation passengers. Section 114 of the 
ATSA grants the TSA the responsibility for security in all modes of transportation. 
Section 114(f) grants the TSA authority to “receive, assess, and distribute 
intelligence information related to transportation security” and “assess threats to 
transportation.” The SPOT program is one means by which the TSA fulfills that 
responsibility, which enables the BDOs in the field to assess individuals 
exhibiting behaviors indicative of terrorist activity and referring them for additional 
screening or law enforcement officer (LEO) intervention. Many legal precedents 
and lawsuit outcomes are based on the interpretation of this document, most 
notably, the decision that participating in commercial transportation is not a 
constitutional right, and therefore, TSA screening is not a violation of privacy or 
civil rights.  
3. Best Practices for TSA Behavior Detection 
During the creation of SPOT, the TSA consulted with the FBI behavioral 
analysis unit, DHS behavioral sciences division, and subject matter experts 
(SME) in the field including Israeli security and El Al airlines. Published opinions 
on the subject range from “we should just do what Israel does” to more realistic 
opinions that recognize the scalability issues and unique challenges faced in the 
44 Security Administration, Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, Transportation 2001), http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/ 
Aviation_and_Transportation_Security_Act_ATSA_Public_Law_107_1771.pdf.  
 22 
                                            
United States.45 With numerous persons or entities claiming to be “experts” in 
the field, opinions vary on what the TSA’s problems are; however, most sources 
agree that the interview process or using behavior detection techniques is a valid 
security technique, particularly because automated detection technology has a 
finite capability and is not infallible; therefore, it is also essential to search for 
intent, and not just “things.”46 Sources related to the subject of best practices 
include several credible experts from university professors to high-ranking Israeli 
security officials. Included in best practices is information from SPOT contributor 
Detective Lieutenant Peter J. DiDomenica at the Massachusetts State Police, 
which includes principles from the disciplines of physiology, psychology, 
neuroscience, specific research regarding suicide bombers, as well as a pioneer 
practitioner’s perspective.47 
4. Summary 
The subject of deception detection (not behavior detection) is well 
documented on both sides and remains highly controversial, with test conditions 
and laboratory limitations proving to be a point of contention. Opinions vary 
widely on the use of such techniques in an airport environment. Dissenters cite 
privacy concerns, scientific cultural variance, fatigue, and concept of operations; 
while supporters cite lab results and anecdotal evidence from the law 
enforcement realm. The congressional pressure to prove the effectiveness of the 
program or lose funding will force TSA to improve technique, and eliminate any 
appearance of profiling. Both the negative and positive literature has provided 
valuable insight into the direction for a thesis on this topic.  
45 New York Times, “Aviation Security and the Israeli Model,” September 30, 2009, 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/aviation-security-and-the-israeli-
model/?_r=0#more-27215.  
46 New York Times, “What’s Missing in Airport Security?” December 28, 2012, 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/whats-missing-in-airport-security/.  
47 Ibid., 4.  
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research is focused on improving the TSA’s SPOT program to 
maintain a countermeasure that provides threat agnostic detection capability, as 
well as a valuable deterrence. The research includes identifying the strengths 
and weaknesses of the current SPOT policy and procedures, as well as an 
analysis of the recent GAO and OIG SPOT audits.  
The traveling public is reliant on the TSA’s multilayered, risk-based 
approach to aviation security. SPOT is one of the most important and unique 
layers available to the TSA in that it is threat agnostic, designed to detect intent 
versus things. The need to detect intent becomes more evident when considering 
the number of “things” that could threaten aviation security, and the technology 
and process required to detect those things. SPOT also provides an important 
element of deterrence, as no blueprint, published capability, or known state of the 
art is readily available, as with other automated physical screening equipment. 
Losing this layer to lack of funding or lack of understanding could leave a 
significant gap in the layered system, which leaves only the documented, finite 
detection capabilities of physical screening equipment.  
The science of behavior detection is controversial at best. Although the 
paper addresses the basic principles and capabilities, as well as the documented 
criticism, it does not attempt to quantitatively prove the effectiveness of behavior 
detection. The science in general has both staunch proponents and equally 
staunch detractors; however, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the 
science accurately due to limited sample size and the inability to imitate the 
emotions associated with the fear, stress, or anxiety effectively that would 
accompany an attempt to commit a terrorist attack. The study addresses the 
GAO analysis, literature review, and conclusions regarding the TSA’s SPOT 
program.  
The focus of the paper is on TSA’s implementation of behavior detection 
through the SPOT program, and whether the TSA can measure effectiveness 
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and implement strategic changes to add security value to the program. The GAO 
and OIG have independently made recommendations for SPOT, some of which 
are obvious and operational in nature and are not addressed at length. For 
example, both the GAO and OIG found inconsistencies with the TSA’s data input 
systems and methods, which is an operational issue easily addressed and not 
within the scope of this study. Rather, this study attempts to determine if 
evidence is available to support the continuation of SPOT, as well as determining 
whether strategic improvements could add security value and credibility to this 
controversial program.  
The scientific evidence available related to deception detection comes 
from published works by psychologists and behaviorists, academic journals from 
experts in the field, meta-analyses for test and evaluation of deception detection, 
and expert opinion from practitioners. This study attempts to ensure all results 
are understood within the context and conditions of the studies performed, rather 
than base conclusions on purely quantitative output data. Additionally, this study 
investigates the possibility of quantifying the deterrence value of this security 
measure, which has been mentioned by the TSA administrator.  
Much of the summative data for the program comes from published, 
unclassified versions of GAO and OIG reports (provided by the TSA and 
assumed to be accurate). Also important to the study are other official 
government publications, such as sections of public law, Congressional reports, 
and expert Congressional testimony. Internal TSA news stories, as well as public 
published versions, are also used when necessary as qualitative support of 
program effectiveness or value added.  
Two analyses were performed to reach the conclusions and 
recommendations of this study. The first was an analysis of the GAO and OIG 
reports that have drawn conclusions based on their own analysis. This portion is 
essentially an analysis of an analysis to determine if conclusions drawn by the 
GAO and OIG audits were based on robust, accurate analysis of the program 
data. The rest of the analysis was conducted using standard policy analysis 
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techniques to assess the strengths and weaknesses of TSA’s SPOT program 
based on publicly available information. As the landscape of threat and risk 
mature, it is more important than ever for security policies and programs to 
evolve and improve to keep up with the changing environment. The use of 
behavior detection by the TSA has been in place since 2007; however, few 
changes have been made to the implementation or the strategic direction of the 
program. To determine if a new strategic direction can improve the SPOT 
program, a multi-goal policy analysis was conducted while implementing the 
existing analysis of the GAO and OIG throughout. Existing information was 
gathered and synthesized to form a baseline understanding of the current 
landscape. To provide scope and direction to the project, impact categories were 
derived from the literature, which include: 1) candidate selection, 2) training 
methods, 3) utilization concepts, and 4) evaluation mechanisms.  
The study contains quantitative data used by both the TSA and GAO to 
assess the SPOT program effectiveness, such as annual budget, number of 
officers, interactions, referrals, and arrests, cost per referral, cost per arrest, etc. 
Much of the study is based on quantitative analysis derived from the literature, 
which explains why a certain method or recommendation would be beneficial. 
The study also focuses on missing data that may strengthen or alter some of the 
existing conclusions about SPOT. Additionally, sub-analyses are weaved into the 
recommendations that may address best practices of other agencies, and 
academic documentation that supports a recommendation. Qualitative analysis 
includes topics, such as why one training method is better than another, why 
meta-cognitive testing can improve performance, why certain human factors data 
may help improve concept of operations (CONOPS), and why deterrence is a 
valuable performance indicator, although maybe not measureable in the 
traditional sense. The project resulted in a defensible and contextually accurate 
assessment of the existing documentation, as well as actionable 
recommendations for strategic improvement to SPOT. The recommendations 
demonstrate a true understanding of the current landscape, provide a realistic 
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path forward while acknowledging that they are major strategic shifts, and require 
an entirely new framework for SPOT in the future. They are intended to be 
actionable recommendations for consideration and implementation by 
TSA/SPOT leadership and program officials.  
D. OVERVIEW OF REMAINING CHAPTERS 
The study begins with a brief background of SPOT, to include the history 
of the program, a look at the current state, and the current debate over the 
effectiveness of such techniques. Chapter III begins the assessment of the GAO 
and OIG conclusions from their respective audits. Chapter IV follows with a policy 
analysis reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of SPOT based on GAO and 
OIG audits, as well as publicly available information. Finally, in Chapter V, 
recommendations for SPOT are based on an analysis of the existing data and 
the available literature, with every attempt made to take the literature’s 
conclusions in correct context and make the relevant applications to SPOT.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
To assess the SPOT program accurately, it is necessary to understand 
the background, not only operationally, but politically as well. This section also 
discusses the current status of SPOT. 
A. HISTORY 
The TSA has been practicing behavior detection techniques since 2004 
when it launched behavior analysis experiments at Portland International Jetport 
and T. F. Green International Airport.48 This program was a product of TSA 
collaboration with the Massachusetts State Police Department, which was 
operating a similar program called behavior assessment screening system 
(BASS). The BASS (and subsequently SPOT) program is primarily based on the 
research of Detective Lieutenant Peter J. DiDomenica, which includes principles 
from the disciplines of physiology, psychology, and neuroscience, as well as 
specific research regarding suicide bombers.49 The basic premise is that a 
engaged in high consequence deception is experiencing fear (of discovery), 
stress, anxiety, or excitement leading up to and during the activity. This fear or 
anxiety present visually to a trained observer, as involuntary physical and 
physiological activity, such as increased heart rate, facial displays of emotion, 
changes in speed and direction of movement, nervous sweating, as well as other 
similar manifestations.50  
The program also considers certain characteristics of physical appearance 
that indicate something is abnormal (for example baggy winter clothing in 
summer); these characteristics are not related to race, ethnicity, or religion. If the 
assessment of appearance and behavior lead the officer to believe something is 
48 The TSA Spot Program: A Law Enforcement Perspective: Hearing before the U.S. House 
of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight, 5. 
49 Ibid., 4.  
50 Ibid. 
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outside the norm, then the officer may also approach the subject with casual 
conversation, and then analyzes the subject’s responses for anomalies (for 
example, level of comfort/knowledge about their circumstances, travel plans, 
etc.). Lieutenant DiDomenica describes the program using the acronym A-B-C-D, 
which stands for analysis of baseline, addition of a catalyst, and scan for 
deviations.51 In the TSA world, a catalyst could be the screening process, a 
casual conversation with a BDO, the presence of a canine team, or anything that 
could potentially expose the subject’s intentions (in the mind of the subject). The 
TSA simply describes the program as “identifying persons who may pose a 
potential security risk at TSA-regulated airports by focusing on behaviors and 
appearances that deviate from an established baseline and that may be 
indicative of stress, fear, or deception.”52 The “baseline” principle is of key 
significance in the practice of behavior detection. The baseline principle is simply 
knowing the everyday, common circumstances so well that anything outside of 
those parameters stands out. A good example would be an experienced bank 
teller easily picking out a counterfeit bill while counting a stack of cash. They are 
so experienced with the feel of real cash (the baseline) that they can 
instantaneously identify a counterfeit bill while rapidly peeling through a large 
stack of bills. Similarly, the practice of behavior detection relies on the theory that 
a well-trained and experienced officer conducting observations of thousands of 
“regular” individuals in an airport environment could easily identify a person who 
looked or acted in a manner outside the norm or baseline (i.e., threatening or 
malintent). In conducting observations, the officers are presumably familiar with 
the normal actions or reactions of both experienced and inexperienced travelers 
that comprise their standard population, and are aware that traveling in general, 
or specific traveling circumstances, may be stressful for some of the population.  
51 The TSA Spot Program: A Law Enforcement Perspective: Hearing before the U.S. House 
of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight,  4.  
52 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate 
TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to 
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, 1.  
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The collaborative pilot programs eventually became the TSA SPOT 
program, and in 2007, the TSA created a new position called BDO designed to 
screen passengers at federalized civil aviation airports using BASS-like 
techniques.53 The purpose of the program is to identify or deter “terrorists 
attempting to exploit TSA’s focus on prohibited items and other potential security 
weaknesses.”54 This program could also be described as threat agnostic, as the 
TSA is screening passengers for intent versus screening them for prohibited 
items. Since the initial pilot, the SPOT program has developed its own unique 
CONOPS based on a point system. Point values are pre-assigned to specified 
behaviors, and then the BDOs cumulatively score individuals being evaluated. 
Their response to the individual (ignore, escalate to conversation, escalate to 
additional screening, or escalate to law enforcement) corresponds to different 
pre-determined point thresholds. The point system is unique to the TSA’s 
application of behavior analysis and provides a framework that encourages 
objective application of the process while discouraging profiling or bias based on 
race, religion, appearance, etc.55  
The GAO noted that the TSA deployed the SPOT program nationwide 
without “first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using 
behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying 
passengers as potential threats in airports.”56 With a significant budget (primarily 
for staff) and lack of empirical evidence that the program is effective, it is not 
surprising that the program has been the subject of major scrutiny. Over the past 
four years, the TSA’s SPOT program has undergone two GAO audits and an 
OIG audit, which provides a total of 17 recommended actions to improve the 
53 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate 
TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to 
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, 1. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 10. 
56 Ibid., 14. 
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program. The respective recommendations are listed as follows, with the more 
strategically relevant (and addressed in this study) in bold (summarized):57 
• Conduct a comprehensive validation study of the principles of 
SPOT. 
• Conduct a comprehensive airport risk assessment to inform 
deployment of SPOT. 
• Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of SPOT. 
• Revise and implement strategic plan to include risk assessment 
(above) and cost (above). 
• Study the feasibility of using checkpoint surveillance video of 
terrorists to understand behaviors. 
• Improve data input procedures for the transportation information 
sharing system. 
• Standardize BDO communication guidance with the transportation 
security operations center (TSOC). 
• Direct TSOC to use all available law enforcement and intelligence 
databases when running LEO referral names. 
• Establish a method to measure the effectiveness of the program 
and evaluate BDO performance. 
• Establish data input controls to ensure complete, valid, accurate 
data is entered into the system. 
• Systematically conduct evaluations of the SPOT training program. 
The OIG audit acknowledged the GAO findings and added the following 
(summarized).58 
• Develop a comprehensive strategic plan for SPOT. 
57 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate 
TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to 
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, 60–62. 
58 Office of Inspector General, Transportation Security Administration’s Screening of 
Passengers by Observation Techniques (Redacted), 2. 
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• Develop and implement controls to ensure completeness, 
accuracy, AUTHORIZATION, and validity of referral data entered 
into the system. 
• Develop and implement a plan that provides recurrent training for 
the BDOs and BDO instructors. 
• Develop a plan to assess the BDO instructor’s performance on a 
regular basis. 
• Monitor and track the use of the BDOs for non-SPOT related 
duties. 
• Develop a process for identifying and addressing issues that affect 
the success of the SPOT program, such as the selection, 
allocation, and performance of the BDOs. 
B. CURRENT STATE 
The SPOT program is organized into two offices, the threat assessment 
capabilities (TAC) division, which drives the program’s strategy and direction, 
and the real time threat assessment division (TAD), which runs the day-to-day 
operations. SPOT has expanded to ~160 airports and now has more than 3,000 
BDOs; additionally, the TSA has requested a Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 budget of 
$227 million, a 15 percent increase over five years.59 As far as the FY15 budget 
is concerned, the TSA currently owes the GAO a response as to whether the 
SPOT program is effective at identifying terrorist intent. As such, Congress has 
not only reduced the FY15 budget, but also withheld $25 million of the approved 
budget pending an evidentiary response from the TSA that the program’s 
behavioral indicators are effective. The budget hostage situation is potentially 
due to the TSA not providing a robust challenge to the GAO report findings; had 
they done so, it may be that accepting some of the recommendations while 
providing robust academic defense of the program may have ended the debate. 
The SPOT program seems to be suffering from an identity crisis, in part due to 
the GAO audit and related conclusions, but also from a lack of innovation and 
59 United States Government Accountability Office, Transportation Security Administration: 
Progress and Challenges Faced in Strengthening Three Security Programs (GAO-12-541T) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012), 6. 
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proactivity by the SPOT program. The GAO used academic literature regarding 
human lie detection capabilities to draw conclusions about SPOT. While the TSA 
did rebut the findings, they did little to differentiate SPOT techniques from human 
lie detection, and subsequently, the press and outside organizations now equate 
BDOs applying SPOT to human lie detectors.  
Recently, however, the DHS did perform an independent evaluation of 
SPOT effectiveness, which yielded highly favorable results, but it was not 
delivered until well past the due date, and rejected by the GAO due to poor test 
construction. As it stands, it appears likely that unless the TSA can make 
substantive, strategic changes to the SPOT program, they may lose funding for it 
altogether.  
1. Concept of Operations
The TSA operates SPOT in several configurations, with the most 
prevalent being simple observation and engagement of passengers in the 
security screening queue, and most recently, managed inclusion (MI) supporting 
TSA Pre™ operations at the airport. The observation of passengers includes the 
BDOs working in pairs, apart from one another but in communication, and 
observing large queues of passengers entering the checkpoint. In this case, the 
BDOs may engage passengers in casual conversation, or more directed 
conversation if they feel the passenger is exhibiting any signs of deception or 
indicating behaviors inconsistent with an aviation traveler. In the MI configuration, 
the BDOs work in conjunction with K9 teams or explosives trace detection (ETD) 
sampling teams to include (through lack of exclusion) additional passengers into 
the expedited TSA Pre™ screening lane. The BDOs also operate in a highly 
mobile configuration as partners in a visible intermodal prevention and response 
(VIPR) team. The team can consist of TSOs, BDOs and federal air marshals 
(FAM) working with state and local law enforcement to augment security forces in 
the transportation domain. These mobile teams are intended to be deployed to 
transportation sectors other than aviation, including rail, mass transit, pipeline, 
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etc.60 The protocol in each of these configurations is essentially the same, and is 
more accurately described as the three locations or circumstances in which 
SPOT is conducted. The actual SPOT activity consists of the BDOs observing 
passengers as they approach different “stressors” of the screening process, such 
as a K9 team, an ETD machine, or a travel document checker (TDC). Faced with 
these stressors, passengers may begin exhibiting uncontrollable physiological 
behaviors (associated with fear of discovery), such as sweating, nervous 
behavior, or other behaviors inconsistent with the normal behavior of an aviation 
passenger in those same circumstances. These physical layers of security may 
illicit deceptive behavior from an approaching terrorist or criminal, and cue the 
BDOs to engage the passenger with either casual or directed questioning 
(according to their training), which may confirm or dispel the suspicious behavior. 
For example, passengers who exhibit suspicious behavior as they approach the 
TDC may be carrying a fake ID, or they may be nervous because they do not 
speak English. If observed by the BDOs, the BDOs may ask directed questioning 
that can reveal criminal activity, such as the possession of a fraudulent 
document, or can simply reveal that the passenger is a non-English speaker who 
is nervous about the potential communication issues at the TDC. The BDOs use 
their training and critical thinking to assess each situation using the totality of 
circumstances and conditions. Persistent or unresolved suspicious matters are 
directed to local law enforcement for further assessment. 
Law enforcement agencies and anti-terrorist organizations worldwide, 
including the FBI, CIA, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF), state/local law enforcement agencies, and the “gold standard” of aviation 
security in Israel, use similar principles as an alternative to purely automated 
countermeasures. However, when the politically charged topic of domestic 
aviation security is added to the mix, it is necessary to provide meaningful 
justification for the program rather than “it works because it works.” It is 
60 “Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR),” August 23, 2013, http://www. 
tsa.gov/about-tsa/visible-intermodal-prevention-and-response-vipr.  
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reasonable for lawmakers and budget czars to request program justification from 
the TSA; however, it is a complex task to prove the effectiveness of SPOT with 
such limited data available, and such a unique threat environment in which no 
attacks on domestic aviation have been conducted. Drawing conclusions about 
effectiveness based on the number of terrorists captured will have implications 
for most anti-terrorism organizations within the DHS. The GAO has stated in its 
audit reports that 1) “available evidence does not support whether behavioral 
indicators, which are used in the…..TSA.... SPOT program, can be used to 
identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security,”61 and 2) the literature 
review does not validate the practice/science of behavior detection.62 While this 
thesis does not attempt to prove the controversial science of human lie detection, 
the next few paragraphs are dedicated to analyzing the GAO conclusions that led 
to these claims to determine whether the TSA SPOT program adds security 
value and should continue to operate in an airport environment. 
61 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit 
Future Funding for Behavior Detection, 1. 
62 Ibid., 16.  
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III. ANALYSIS OF GAO CLAIMS 
While the GAO and OIG have made several valid tactical 
recommendations, such as improving data collection, improving communication, 
and studying the viability of the use of close captioned television (CCTV), they 
were all precluded by the claim that SPOT techniques are not effective and that 
no evidence or literature exists to the contrary. Their analysis of the TSA SPOT 
data resulted in the conclusion that the TSA could not demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the program. However, additional research into the techniques 
indicates that they can work, so it must be determined if the TSA can take 
corrective action to make the practice viable in an airport environment. Most law 
enforcement agencies teach and use similar principles, and the DHS has an 
entire department dedicated to behavioral science. To determine if the GAO’s 
conclusions are based on robust evaluation of the data, this analysis reviews 
several of their claims for context and validity. That is not to imply that the GAO 
has intentionally misrepresented any facts, or that the documentation it relied on 
is inaccurate, but rather to determine if contextual nuances exist within the data 
that could indicate alternative conclusions. While the GAO strives to be an 
independent, data driven organization, this analysis will determine the accuracy 
of their conclusions by focusing on the context of the data used.  
A. SPOT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED EFFECTIVENESS 
A combination of claims that SPOT needs to 1) establish a method to 
measure performance of the BDOs, and 2) establish data input controls to 
ensure the accuracy of data, which leads this study to conclude that SPOT has a 
strategic metric issue. Collecting data with sufficient accuracy can be easily 
addressed operationally, but must be done before any data can be used and 
analyzed to indicate effectiveness. However, the larger problem is that SPOT 
needs to establish metrics that, when analyzed, would be indicative of 
performance. The lack of fidelity into SPOT performance has led the GAO to 
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withhold budget from SPOT, but worse than that, suggests that the TSA may not 
actually know how effective the program is. The TSA can demonstrate that SPOT 
regularly identifies criminals at the checkpoint, those intending to commit or in the 
act of committing a crime, such as smuggling, kidnapping, human trafficking, 
child pornography, etc. (see Figure 3). It is indicative of some success since 
persons engaged in high-stakes deception will react predictably to the fear of 
discovery. Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain a true P(d) (using criminal 
identification as proxy data) because it is not possible to also know how many 
persons actively engaged in criminal or deceptive behavior have passed through 
the system without being caught. It is impossible to prove the negative, which 
makes it impossible to obtain a true P(d), and complicates the analysis for both 
the GAO and TSA. Suggestions on how to understand and begin measuring 
effectiveness are included in Chapter V.  
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Figure 3.  TSA SPOT Referral/Arrest Rates63 
B. SPOT HAS NOT CAUGHT A SINGLE TERRORIST 
The GAO notes that the SPOT program has not caught a single terrorist, 
which indicates that the program is not an effective anti-terrorist tactic. As a 
simple bullet point, the claim is certainly accurate, but taken in context may not 
be indicative of a lack of effectiveness. No known plots or attack attempts against 
domestic aviation have occurred since 9/11, which means no relevant data is 
available from which to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of any aviation 
countermeasure or program. Additionally, all TSA security programs (and most 
other domestic anti-terrorism programs) are operating in the same environment. 
Given the low frequency of terrorist attacks originating in the United States, 
63 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit 
Future Funding for Behavior Detection, 8. 
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success cannot be measured by the number of terrorists captured. By this logic, 
the United States should also stop inspecting luggage and persons at the airport 
and borders, since no terrorists have been captured using these methods. The 
logic used by the GAO is akin to saying that a designated hitter in a baseball 
game is ineffective because he got zero hits in the game. It may be true that he 
did not get a single hit, but that data point is not sufficient to draw conclusions 
about his performance. To assess his effectiveness, it is also essential to know 
how many at bats the hitter attempted. In both cases (SPOT and the baseball 
player) the data alone does not provide sufficient backing from which to draw 
conclusions about effectiveness. The low frequency of terrorist attacks (or lack of 
data) makes it difficult for either the GAO or TSA (really all of the DHS) to 
understand the effectiveness of anti-terrorist programs. However, it may be that 
SPOT and other security programs are providing an intangible level of 
deterrence, which makes aviation an unattractive terrorism target due to the 
adversaries’ reduced likelihood of success, whether real or perceived. 
Neither the TSA nor GAO knows how many terrorist plots against aviation 
have existed, been attempted, or possibly even been thwarted or deterred by the 
mere existence of the TSA. What is known is that zero successful terrorist 
attacks against domestic aviation has occurred, and while the DHS cannot 
necessarily attribute that success to any program (for the same reasons), it is 
certainly not appropriate to use it as evidence that a program does not work. If 
success were measured by the number of terrorists apprehended, then most 
anti-terrorist organizations would be considered ineffective. The lack of data does 
not correlate to a lack of effectiveness; however, it does indicate that proxy 
methods need to be developed to understand effectiveness.  
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C. SPOT FAILED TO INTERCEPT TERRORISTS ON 23 OCCASIONS 
The GAO analysis also noted that 16 known or suspected terrorists (KST) 
have moved through eight SPOT airports no fewer than 23 times.64 As a data 
point, it would seemingly prove that SPOT is ineffective; however, taken in 
context is not an indicator of performance. Several of the KSTs were leaving the 
country, and none of them was engaged in an imminent plot against domestic 
aviation, and as such, was not engaged in any deceptive behavior while 
traversing the airports. The principles of SPOT are based on the “fear of 
discovery,” and a KST simply travelling from place to place would not be 
expected to exhibit behaviors consistent with deception. The initial statement of 
this point seems like reason enough to eliminate SPOT; however, taken in 
context, this data point does not support the implication that SPOT should have 
stopped these travelers.  
D. SPOT IS APPLIED INCONSISTENTLY  
The GAO also criticizes the program for having variable referral rates, 
noting that the secondary screening referral rates range from zero to 26 referrals 
per BDO per 160 hours worked, and LEO referrals range from zero to eight per 
160 hours worked.65 The TSA provided the data for analysis (Figure 4), which is 
presumably accurate; however, plausible reasons may exist for the variance in 
referral rates other than blatant inconsistency. To have high confidence in this 
claim, based on the data provided, the GAO may have been better served to 
consider the data at an airport level, checkpoint level, and even shift level. A 
particular airport may have more criminal activity occurring within their traveling 
population than another airport, which yields more referrals per BDO than 
another airport. Likewise, a particular checkpoint may have more criminal activity 
64 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate 
TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to 
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, 46. 
65 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit 
Future Funding for Behavior Detection, 6. 
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due to the arrival destinations served by the airlines at that checkpoint. For 
example, if one checkpoint has flights that leave for a destination known for drug 
activity, then a higher percentage of criminal activity might be expected in that 
checkpoint, which results in more referrals per 160 hours, as compared to a 
checkpoint servicing a low crime area. At the shift level, it could be that a certain 
international flight leaves only after 8 p.m. and contains a high percentage of 
selectees. Thus, the BDOs working those hours may expect to refer a higher 
percentage of passengers, even compared to the same airport and checkpoint 
during the morning hours. To draw conclusions about the variance in referral 
percentage, the GAO would want to also include data from the travelling 
populations of different airports, checkpoints, flights, etc., to determine if the 
variances were consistent with what could be expected from that traveling 
population. The fact may very well be that the variance in referral rates is due to 
inconsistency, but other relevant conditional data need to be considered when 
drawing that conclusion.  
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Figure 4.  TSA Referral Rates among 49 Airports66 
A more valuable data point to understand consistency would have been 
the arrest per referral ratio. The GAO noted (in a footnote) that this ratio ranged 
from zero to 17 percent of referrals amongst the 49 airports, but did not draw any 
specific conclusions from the data point. While several factors influence this 
outcome, such as local police policies on arrests for certain offenses, this data 
point does indicate a performance difference amongst the BDOs at different 
airports. This data is valuable as a comparison with other airports and even the 
individual BDO population. If all BDOs were performing at the same level of 
proficiency, then much smaller variance in arrest ratio or prohibited item ratio per 
referral (not provided by TSA) would be expected. For comparison purposes, no 
conclusions can be drawn about the ideal arrest or prohibited item detection per 
referral ratio, but it can be assumed that the higher the ratio, the higher the 
66 United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, 
Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit Future Funding for Behavior Detection Activities (GAO-14-
159) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 26. 
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accuracy of the BDO, with the total number of referrals being irrelevant. The 
GAO did not specifically call this out, but the variance in arrest to referral ratio is 
indicative of variable performance amongst BDO programs at the airport level. 
Further investigation could parse out individual BDO performance related to the 
arrest to referral ratio. The benefit of looking at performance or consistency from 
this angle is that the performance is measured by the outcome rather than the 
output, with the number of referrals being a meaningless output, and the ratio of 
arrests or prohibited item detection to referrals being a valuable outcome metric.  
The GAO and OIG both made recommendations regarding the training 
and training instructors for SPOT, which suggests that the TSA provide recurrent 
training to instructors and consistently evaluate the instructor’s performance. 
Using the variable referral data, arrest to referral ratio, instructor performance 
data, and the number of instructors and training locations together may have 
strengthened the conclusion that the TSA SPOT is applied inconsistently 
throughout the country. 
E. LITERATURE DOES NOT VALIDATE THE PRACTICE  
In 2008, the National Research Council of the National Academy of 
Sciences issued a report confirming that behavior and appearance monitoring 
might be able to play a useful role in counterterrorism. They also concluded that 
no consensus exists within the scientific community that these techniques are 
ready for use in the counterterrorism environment.67 The state of research on the 
topic is thus summarized, with most studies, both for and against, concluding, 
“more research is needed.” However, close examination of the academic 
research used by the GAO shows that it is using the performance of only “human 
lie detectors” as a proxy for SPOT performance, which is an apples-to-oranges 
comparison, and the studies compiled do not approximate the techniques used 
67 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate 
TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to 
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, 15. 
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by SPOT. They are similar in nature, like apples and oranges are both 
categorized as fruit, but not sufficient to draw even basic comparisons.  
The GAO conclusions rely primarily on two well-known meta-analyses as 
its basis of scientific evidence for SPOT. Meta-analyses, although they are great 
time savers, can be misused and misinterpreted. For example, the more studies 
they include, the less likely it is that the conditions and populations were 
sufficiently replicated across studies. Thus, the compilation is often less relevant 
than an individual study with contextually accurate test conditions. Some 
common academic criticisms of meta-analysis include the following.68  
• One number cannot summarize a research field. 
• They are easily biased by not including all studies in the field. 
• Commonly mix apples and oranges (large variance in test 
conditions). 
• Important studies are ignored. 
• Replication of conditions is unlikely in multiple studies. 
Critics of meta-analysis use the treatment of acute versus chronic pain symptoms 
as an example of how meta-analysis can result in misleading results. For 
example, if a treatment works great for acute symptoms, but is ineffective against 
chronic symptoms, then the combined meta-data would show the treatment is 
moderately effective. The “moderate” conclusion is inaccurate for both 
populations and conditions; the treatment is extremely effective in acute 
conditions, and completely ineffective in chronic conditions.69 It is a classic 
example of a poor study selection. The Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine 
makes the point simply with the statement, “The outcome of a meta-analysis 
depends on the studies included.”70 A certain naiveté exists in drawing general 
68 Michael Borenstein, “Ch. 43 Criticisms of Meta-Analysis,” in Introduction to Meta-analysis, 
ed. Borenstein et al. (Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 377–387. 
69 Ibid., 380. 
70 Estaban Walker, “Meta-analysis: Its Strengths and Limitations,” Cleveland Clinic Journal 
of Medicine 756 (June 2008): 432, doi: 10.3949/ccjm.75.6.431. 
 45 
                                            
conclusions about SPOT from a specific, bounded, limited set of studies. That is 
not to say that the meta-analysis does not serve a purpose, or that the developer 
of the meta-analyses intended to mislead anyone, but understanding the 
limitations of the meta-analysis may help the GAO add context to its conclusions.  
For example, one of the primary meta-analyses used by the GAO is 
completely focused on studies containing interview techniques and the ability of a 
person to detect a lie during an interview with the conclusion that test subjects 
were little better than chance at detecting the deception.71 SPOT is not a human 
lie detection program, and numerous issues have been raised with using this 
meta-analysis to draw conclusions about SPOT. For one, SPOT is not strictly an 
interview technique; in fact, the interview is a last resort, as the bulk of the 
practice is based on the observation of a person’s appearance and behaviors, 
and the analysis of those cues against the context of the current circumstances. 
The BDOs have the advantage of being able to observe the passengers without 
necessarily being observed themselves, in which case the passengers are not 
inclined to hide any particular behavior or pattern. In the referenced meta-
analysis, neither the subject matter, nor the interviewer, nor the interviewee 
correlates to those in a SPOT scenario. The BDOs uses their training and critical 
thinking to determine the appropriate resolution using the totality of 
circumstances; they do not interview every nervous passenger. During the 
GAO’s two-year sampling period involving 49 airports, 365 of the 8,700 SPOT 
LEO referrals were arrested for fraudulent credentials, possession of weapons, 
warrants, etc.72 While the ratio is not particularly impressive, it still represents 
hundreds of criminals removed from the transportation system. The untold 
portion of the story (in part due to poor data collection by the TSA) is that many 
interactions also end up with the confiscation of dangerous prohibited items, 
although the passengers may not be arrested for whatever reason. An 
71 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit 
Future Funding for Behavior Detection, 51. 
72 Ibid., 44. 
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independent assessment of SPOT concluded that SPOT was nine times more 
effective at identifying persons engaged in criminal activity or possessing a 
dangerous item than the random selection of passengers for additional 
scrutiny;73 however, the GAO has rejected these results citing a number of 
limitations. While the TSA acknowledges the limitations of the study, it stands by 
the macro level data, which indicates SPOT is substantially better at identifying 
high-risk individuals than random selection.74 
Both the TSA and GAO face a dilemma when relying on results from lab 
testing, as most researches agree that lab research uses non-representative 
samples and low-stakes, trivial lies; the results of such tests are controversial, if 
not questionable. The liars used in the studies are mostly psychology students 
telling lies of no consequence (selected by the experimenter). The research 
participant pool designated as liars is not representative of the travelling public, 
and had no emotional stake in the lie or the outcome of the interaction with the lie 
catcher. The lie catchers frequently had no training whatsoever, and are not 
representative of trained SPOT practitioners or other professionals using these 
techniques.  
DePaulo et al. note that cues to deception are stronger when lies are 
about transgressions,75 which indicates that subjects forced to tell a lie of no 
consequence may not exhibit the same cues to deception as someone with a 
stake in the lie. In other words, smuggling a bomb through airport security will be 
more stressful (greater consequence) than smuggling a candy bar out of the 
corner drug store; thus, the high-stakes actor is more likely to exhibit irrepressible 
physiological responses and deceptive behavior. The studies did not attempt to 
replicate the heightened fear of discovery associated with committing a criminal 
73 Behavioral Science and Security: Evaluating TSA’s SPOT (Screening of Passengers by 
Observational Techniques) Program: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and 
Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight. 
74 Ibid., 89. 
75 Depaulo et al., “Cues to Deception,” 74. 
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or terrorist act, and therefore, the results of the studies appear to be limited in 
their applicability to SPOT.  
Also of note, the meta-analyses do not refer to SPOT and were not 
compiled for the purpose of assessing SPOT. Re-creating the conditions of a real 
liar versus lie catcher scenario has plagued researchers for decades; however, 
newer research is attempting to focus on high-stakes lies by studying criminals 
and law enforcement officers in real scenarios.  
The GAO analysis would have benefited from the inclusion of some high-
stakes studies, such as O’Sullivan’s 2009 meta-analysis compiling data from 31 
police departments in eight countries, and concluding that high-stakes lies were 
detected at rate of 67.15 percent, while the low stakes lies were only detected at 
a rate of 55.17 percent.76 Too many inconsistencies and dissimilarities within the 
GAO used meta-analyses exist to make any responsible comparisons with, or 
judgments of SPOT, not to mention additional studies and meta-analyses with 
contradictory findings.  
F. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT IN DATA ANALYSIS (EVIDENCE) 
When reviewing recommendations from the GAO audit of SPOT, it seems 
as though important contextual nuances were not considered when drawing 
conclusions from the data analysis. Many analyses, particularly difficult ones like 
behavior detection, can become overly focused on quantitative results or 
“outputs” (how many terrorists, how many arrests, how many false alarms, how 
many data input errors, etc.) in lieu of valid methods for assessing program 
effectiveness. While outputs can be reliable indicators of performance, they can 
also be a distraction in a security environment. Security practitioners must be 
more concerned with outcome than output. Outcome is difficult to measure. 
Thus, in many cases, organizations default back to things they can easily 
measure to claim success or failure. The GAO appeared to be strictly focused on 
the outputs of TSA SPOT provided data, and frequently draw conclusions without 
76 O’Sullivan et al., “Police Lie Detection Accuracy: The Effect of Lie Scenario,” 533. 
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the proper context, and never focus on outcome. Based strictly on outcome, it 
could be argued that the TSA “system” is very successful not because it screens 
a lot of people and confiscates a lot of pointy objects, but because zero terrorist 
attacks have occurred on domestic aviation since 9/11. That is not to say the 
system is perfect, but it has certainly made aviation a less attractive target to an 
existing or would-be terrorist. The key element, which is hard to measure—and 
even harder to take credit for—is deterrence. It may be outside the norm for a 
government agency to claim deterrence as success, but it must be factored in 
assessing effectiveness. The bureaucracy should recognize the outcome of the 
system for the last 12 years, and begin to account for deterrence in a security 
agency’s performance goals. In the current environment, if the TSA had caught 
two terrorists and missed one, a measureable 66 percent success rate would 
have occurred, which on paper would be pretty successful, and maybe even 
praised. So which is better? A 66 percent rate (not a bad output), or raising the 
barriers of a successful attack so high that terrorists are 100 percent deterred 
from targeting aviation? In the current state of bureaucracy, the latter receives 
the criticism of “having no evidence to support the effectiveness of the program,” 
even though it meets the desired outcome. The TSA and GAO must resolve their 
cyclical disagreements by beginning to define success, and subsequently, 
measure it using a combination of outcomes and outputs.  
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IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF BEHAVIOR 
DETECTION 
Calling attention to the limitations of the meta-analysis used by the GAO is 
not intended to conclude that TSA SPOT needs no improvement and should 
continue as is. Many areas both strategic and operational require improvement to 
make the program more efficient and effective. In fact, the program has not 
undergone any major improvements since its inception in 2007, and the GAO 
and OIG made several logical operational recommendations that would indeed 
improve the program. However, most of those recommendations do not offer any 
strategic guidance or insight into how to achieve an outcome that would justify 
the existence of the program (a positive outcome would presumably be to 
improve the effectiveness and credibility of the program). Exploring what the 
program does well and poorly may reveal some strategic improvements that will 
help justify the program’s existence, and more importantly, improve the chances 
of finding or identifying a terrorist.  
A. STRENGTHS 
1. Removing Criminals from the Transportation System 
During FY2011 and FY2012, at the 49 airports studied by the GAO, TSA 
SPOT referred 61,000 passengers to secondary screening. Of the 61,000 
referrals, 8,700 were further referred to law enforcement. Of the 8,700, 364 were 
actually arrested by local or federal law enforcement (see Figure 3). However, 
when dealing with statistics, it is important to understand the conditions and 
context of the numbers. For example, the arrest percentage is not very 
impressive if an arrest is the only valuable outcome. Moreover, an arrest is only 
one “successful” outcome, and one that TSA does not control. For example, a 
passenger referred to secondary screening may have been in possession of a 
prohibited item that the TSA or law enforcement confiscated. Confiscating 
dangerous or illegal prohibited items, such as knives, guns, or incendiary devices 
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(not out-of-policy water bottles or a small pair of scissors), is a positive outcome 
of SPOT for which no output measure exists; not only does keeping these items 
off airplanes makes everyone safer, but the discovery of the item is a direct result 
of SPOT intervention. Additionally, these confiscations (even of dangerous items) 
rarely lead to arrest, which means much of the effectiveness data from SPOT 
was not even available for consideration. Additionally, other reasons may explain 
why a passenger with a dangerous item may not be arrested, including the lack 
of law enforcement personnel to respond, and differing laws and regulations in 
different cities/states/jurisdictions. Arrests should be used as a proxy for 
measuring effectiveness, given the lack of terrorist attempts against domestic 
aviation, but should not be the only outcome measure for the effectiveness of the 
program.  
Regardless of a person’s point of view, SPOT kept 365 criminals (from the 
airports and time period under review) from boarding an aircraft, and countless 
dangerous items from getting on board. Criminal referrals and confiscated items 
may have value as a proxy for the ability to detect a terrorist (effectiveness) in the 
absence of actual terrorist attacks or attack data. In fact, the BDOs have also 
been known to discover the TSA “covert” testers intending to carry simulated 
IEDs through the checkpoint.77 Subject to the similar “fear of discovery” 
(although to a lesser degree in the absence of high-stakes consequences) as a 
terrorist, the testers exhibit behaviors that are, at times, recognized by the BDOs.  
2. Flexibility  
Being a human-based capability, the BDOs have several advantages over 
technology-based capability. A key strength of the SPOT program is the ability to 
deploy anywhere, and to alter mission and mission location rapidly without 
significant startup, reposition, or shutdown time. The BDOs are not limited to 
locations with power outlets and lockable storage. The BDOs can and are 
77 Blogger Bob, “The Truth Behind the Title: Behavior Detection Officer,” The TSA Blog, 
February 29, 2008, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/02/truth-behind-title-behavior-detection.html. 
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frequently deployed at aviation security checkpoints, airport perimeters, air 
carrier gates, other areas of the airport, and even to rail locations courtesy of 
VIPR team participation. Due to the flexible nature of behavior detection, it is a 
key component of the TSA’s risk-based security strategy. For example, randomly 
pulling out passengers for additional screening theoretically improves the P(d) of 
the system, but focusing that same level of effort on passengers behaving 
suspiciously makes even more sense than random selection. BDOs can also be 
deployed purposefully. For example, a flight may have two known high-risk 
passengers onboard, which could make it a higher-risk flight than normal; the 
BDOs could be easily deployed to the gate of said flight to observe all 
passengers boarding as an additional informed layer of security. Due to their 
flexible nature, the BDOs also bring about an opportunity for unpredictability. 
Being rapidly deployed to gates, or security identification display area (SIDA) 
access points, or other non-standard locations provides a layer difficult to plan 
for, increases overall security effectiveness, and adds deterrence value. For 
example, a BDO working the public area (prior to the checkpoint) of Orlando 
International airport identified a man exhibiting suspicious behavior. His 
identification of the man’s behavior led to additional scrutiny, including searching 
his checked bags that resulted in the discovery of several unnamed suspicious 
items and the man’s arrest by the FBI.78 No other TSA layer of security is 
frequently active in the public area, and the flexibility of the program allowed this 
man to be identified well before the checkpoint and before he was able to cause 
harm to other passengers.  
3. Deterrence Value 
Deterrence has been mentioned frequently throughout this document, due 
to the immeasurable value that it provides. While it is true that TSA’s SPOT 
program has not apprehended a single terrorist, a single terrorist attack aimed at 
domestic aviation has also not occurred. The outcome is that no attack attempts 
78 Blogger Bob, “Behavior Detection Officers Lead to Arrest in Orlando,” The TSA Blog, April 
04, 2008, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/04/behavior-detection-officers-lead-to.html. 
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originating in the United States have taken placed, most likely due to the 
deterrence value of the layered security system in place. So does the number of 
terrorists apprehended dictate the success of a program? It may if performance 
assessment is inappropriately based on output measurements. However, the fact 
that no terrorist attacks have occurred indicates in large part that the system is 
working. That is not to say that the lack of attacks might not be the result of other 
reasons. Intelligence gathering, the strengthening of passport controlled entry, 
and the weakening of centralized terrorist networks plays a role as well. 
However, the fact remains that it is more difficult today to attack aviation security 
than it was 12 years ago. Advances in technology play a role, but programs like 
SPOT are essential to disrupting the planning of an adversary, and making 
aviation an unattractive target. Unfortunately for the TSA, it is difficult or 
impossible to determine how much of a role deterrence plays in the lack of 
terrorist attacks; however, it should be noted that raising the barrier to entry (for 
an attack) makes aviation a less attractive target. Using the lack of terrorist 
apprehension to indicate the performance of a security program would be like 
removing police patrols in low crime areas. Removing the police officers reduces 
the level of effort required to commit a crime, which suddenly makes the low 
crime area an attractive target for criminals. In a 2013 testimony to the House of 
Representatives, TSA Administrator John Pistole explained to Representative 
Mark Sanford (R-S.C.),  
There’s no perfect science, there’s no perfect art of this…This has 
been over seven years and we have screened by observation over 
4 billion passengers, it actually comes out to 50 cents and in some 
instances 25 cents per passenger. To which the Congressman 
replied, In reverse, you could say, a billion dollars [spent] with no 
results.” Mr. Pistole’s final response: “I would say there’s a result in 
terms of deterrence.79  
79 Ashley Halsey, “House Member Questions $900 Million TSA ‘SPOT’ Screening Program,” 




                                            
The Congressman’s statement is indicative of applying the hermeneutic of 
a budget analyst, versus the more appropriate security context of outcome-
oriented decision making. The Congressman is leaving out the context of 
understanding how many terrorist attempts have been made on domestic 
aviation security. A security system will catch zero terrorists if zero terrorist 
attempts are made. Mr. Pistole’s statement is clearly focused on the outcome of 
having zero terrorist attacks, understanding the contribution of deterrence to 
security, as well as the SPOT’s contribution to deterrence.  
4. Threat Agnosticism 
One of the key features of SPOT is the fact that the officers are trained to 
detect intent based on direct observation of the potential adversary’s behavior. In 
other words, find the bomber not the bomb. Technology provides only a finite, 
inflexible detection capability. For example, an ETD) machine is designed to 
detect numerous types of explosive material, but cannot encompass all types of 
explosive material. Therefore, it is only useful if the adversary is using one of the 
materials that the technology is capable of detecting. Similarly, the walk through 
metal detector (WTMD) is very effective against metallic threats, but it stands to 
reason that it would not be successful against non-metallic explosive material 
carried on the body. The point is that each of these devices depends on a finite 
detection capability provided per government specifications and limited by the 
state of the art of technology (i.e., what capabilities exist). Therefore, the public is 
dependent on the probability that the adversary will choose threat types exactly 
what the TSA’s machines are designed to detect. Technology has made this 
nation safer and further development should be pursued, but technology alone is 
insufficient. Equally important is maintaining a capability not dependent on threat 
type, but on recognizing a potential human threat. Additionally, behavior 
detection is difficult to counter, as a product specification is not available online 
or from the manufacturer, or for sale on eBay. The fact that so many 
misperceptions exist only makes it more perplexing to the adversary, and thus 
increases its deterrence value. In other words, it may be that an adversary could 
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download the user’s guide (or buy the whole system) for a WTMD, ETD, and X-
ray to inform an IED concealment method better, but it will not account for the 
threat agnostic practice of behavior detection. Adversaries will have a difficult 
time planning for the BDO when they do not know when, where, or how the 
countermeasure is being applied. Despite the congressional scrutiny of the U.S. 
program, the international community understands the value of a threat agnostic 
capability, as evidenced by the Israeli dependence on behavior detection 
techniques, and the existence of similar programs in several other countries. 
Simply put, SPOT offers the TSA the capability to detect any type of high-stakes 
threat, including nuclear, explosive, and biological, etc., by observing the 
expected behaviors of a high-stakes adversary going through the stress of the 
inspection process and the fear of discovery. No single detection technology can 
detect such a variety of threats. In fact, behavior detection by security officials 
and passengers identified Richard Reid (the shoe bomber) as a potential threat 
due to his purchase of a ticket with cash, disheveled appearance, blank or empty 
stare, luggage not consistent with travel plan, etc. These “red flags” garnered 
Reid additional scrutiny at the departing airport and he was not allowed to board 
the plane. Unfortunately, the scrutiny did not turn up the IED hidden in his shoes, 
but the point is that a type of behavior detection was successful in identifying his 
intent; finding the IED would have been the responsibility of the physical search 
officers.80  
5. Unintended Benefits 
BDOs, as trained observers, will always notice things that are outside the 
norm. In fact, the longer BDO practice their craft, the more baseline behavior 
data they possess, which they use to make more precise judgments in more 
diverse scenarios. This experience is valuable for more than just screening 
passengers. In fact, keen BDO observation and awareness have led to the 
discovery of many signs of passenger distress, including responding to 
80 Mary Sisson, “Richard Reid (British Militant),” Encyclopedia Britannica Online, March 5, 
2014, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1975161/Richard-Reid.  
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passenger health issues, missing children, and even identifying victims of human 
trafficking. In July 2012, two BDOs in Miami identified a woman who was 
exhibiting unusual behavior. They approached her with casual conversation and 
she indicated that nothing was wrong. After further observation, they approached 
her again with some more specific questions that revealed she was being 
kidnapped. The BDOs’ training and experience led them not only to identify the 
behaviors outside the norm, but also to continue to follow up until a satisfactory 
resolution was reached. In this instance, the BDOs likely saved the woman’s life; 
her four captors were arrested on a variety of charges including kidnapping and 
unlawful detainment.81 Such events are clear indicators that the totality of 
observation techniques are effective at identifying anomalous behavior. In fact, 
the anomalous behavior is sufficient for success; it is not necessary to determine 
the exact intent of the passenger during the interaction. Identifying anomalous 
behavior will prompt the BDOs to either perform additional screening, or refer the 
passenger to a LEO, which allows the other layers of security to confirm and 
resolve the anomalous behavior.  
B. WEAKNESSES 
Isaac Yeffet, former head of security for Israeli state airline El Al, and 
proponent of behavior detection, claims that the TSA’s implementation of 
behavior detection is “worthless,” and cites candidate selection and training as 
the reasons it does not work for the United States.82 The GAO and OIG have 
provided Congress no fewer than 17 recommendations to improve the SPOT 
program. As previously mentioned, some of these recommendations are tactical 
in nature, but very necessary and insightful. Since improving data collection and 
communications do not require graduate level analysis, this analysis attempts to 
81 Willard Shepard, “TSA Agents Rescue Kidnapped Woman,” NBC 6 South Florida. July 31, 
2012, http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Kidnapped-Woman-Was-Rescued-By-TSA-Agents-
at-MIA-Authorities-164345996.html.  
82 Dennis Schaal, “TSA’s Behavioral Detection Skills Are ‘Worthless,’ Says Israeli Aviation 
Security Expert,” Skift, November 13, 2013, http://skift.com/2013/11/15/tsas-behavioral-detection-
techniques-are-worthless-says-former-el-al-security-director/.  
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focus on weaknesses that have strategic impact to the program or program 
effectiveness. Some of the weaknesses included in the following sections were 
expressly, or more often, generally discussed by aviation experts, as well as the 
GAO and OIG, and are noted accordingly.  
1. Utilization 
The media has joked at times that the TSA stands for Thousands standing 
around. This situation is quite possibly the result of the BDOs literally standing 
around. While they are actually conducting their observations, the appearance is 
that they are doing nothing. For both political purposes (the optics) and efficiency 
purposes, the TSA needs to ensure the BDOs are multitasking. The special 
training they receive should not preclude them from also contributing to the 
processing of passengers, or other additional duties, and may actually help them 
engage with more passengers more frequently. SPOT officers are currently 
engaged in three CONOPS, including SPOT operations at the checkpoint, VIPR 
teams, and MI, but each includes only the performance of basic SPOT 
procedures and the perceived change in CONOPS is really just a change in 
location. While valuable from a flexibility standpoint, it does nothing to improve 
the optic of them standing around or the efficiency at the checkpoint. 
Furthermore, the BDOs are hired into full-time positions, but the airport does not 
operate in eight-hour shifts and is only busy during peak times a few hours a day. 
The BDOs may only be “observing” (working) for a couple hours of their actual 
eight-hour shift, which would be fine if they were assigned BDO duties during 
peak times and other duties on non-peak times. Unfortunately, they are not 
performing other duties during their down time, which makes the program appear 
quite inefficient.  
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2. BDO Selection Criteria  
Currently, the TSO pool is the only source of candidates for the BDO 
position.83 No aptitude testing or psychometric testing is applied other than what 
is required to become a Transportation Security Officer (TSO). The BDOs must 
only meet the following hiring requirements (the requirements of a TSO) and are 
eligible to apply for BDO after one year as a TSO.  
• have a high school diploma or general educational development 
(GED) credential OR at least one year of full-time work experience 
in the security industry, aviation screening, or as an X-ray 
technician 
• be proficient in the English language (i.e., able to read, write, 
speak, and listen) 
• be a U.S. Citizen or U.S. national at time of application submission 
• be at least 18 years of age at time of application submission 
• pass a drug screening and medical evaluation 
• pass a background investigation including a credit and criminal 
check 
• no default on $7,500 or more in delinquent debt (but for some 
bankruptcies) 
• selective service registration required84 
Although not attempting to validate the science behind behavior detection, 
the OIG study astutely notes that limiting BDO recruitment to current TSOs may 
not provide the program with the most qualified candidates.85 Obviously, the 
aforementioned criteria do not in any way qualify a person to observe and assess 
behavioral and physiological indicators of a passenger (maybe the one year of 
experience in the airport environment is helpful).  
83 Schaal, “TSA’s Behavioral Detection Skills Are ‘Worthless,’ Says Israeli Aviation Security 
Expert,” 11. 
84 “Transportation Security Officer (TSO),” accessed October 7, 2014, https://www.usajobs. 
gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/383141100.  
85 Ibid., 11. 
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More than a weakness, it should be more accurately described as a flaw 
in strategy of the program. To improve credibility and effectiveness, the TSA 
must address its weak hiring practices for the BDO population.  
3. Training 
The TSA currently requires that the BDOs undergo a four-day classroom 
training session, followed by three days of on-the-job training (OJT). During these 
sessions, BDO candidates must memorize all the program specific behaviors and 
appearances, along with all the associated point values, and pass a job 
knowledge test consisting of multiple choice, true/false, and case-based 
scenarios.86 In May 2011, the TSA also began providing refresher training for 
existing BDOs in response to a job task analysis that indicated observation skills 
are perishable.87 Both the GAO audit and the OIG investigation astutely 
recognized weaknesses within TSA’s SPOT training program when they 
recommended that the TSA evaluate SPOT training periodically, offer refresher 
training to both BDOs and BDO instructors, and have a means to evaluate BDO 
instructors. While all three are logical and valuable, it seems as though they are 
recommendations to address symptoms of the true problems. The sources of 
these symptoms are 1) training inconsistency, and 2) inadequacy of training 
content.  
a. Training Inconsistency 
One of the most important aspects of specialized training for a large 
geographically dispersed population is consistency. At the time of the 2010 GAO 
audit, the TSA had 54 SPOT instructors scattered across the country. While it 
makes sense from an efficiency standpoint to have trainers at airports or regional 
locations, it can be detrimental to the primary outcome of producing BDOs who 
86 United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate 
TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to 
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, 14. 
87 Office of Inspector General, Transportation Security Administration’s Screening of 
Passengers by Observation Techniques (Redacted), 9. 
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will operate consistently across all airports. In 2012, the TSA found that several 
of their BDO instructors “did not have the instructor knowledge, skills, or abilities 
to instruct BDO classes.”88 While the TSA did provide remedial instruction to 
those BDO instructors, the audit brought to light the inevitable variances present 
within a large pool of instructors, which results in inconsistent BDO performance 
in the field. Besides the lack of consistency (or difficulty in producing consistent 
results) and potential variance in quality, maintaining proficiency for 54 
instructors is quite challenging and the infrastructure needed to refresh, evaluate, 
and maintain these instructors may be enough to eliminate any efficiencies 
gained. The potential value of the SPOT security layer and politically charged 
nature of this program demand that it be executed with precision, which requires 
nothing but the highest quality training standards.  
b. Inadequacy of Training Content 
Behavior detection is the most specialized function of TSA screening and 
likely requires the most cognition of any of the TSA screening functions. The TSA 
cannot expect a four-day training class to prepare a TSO adequately to observe 
a passenger’s behavior, appearance, and demeanor, and quickly analyze the 
totality of the circumstances to determine if the passenger poses a threat to 
aviation security. Isaac Yeffet claims El Al Airlines trained their BDOs for 
lengthier periods of time (than the TSA) including three weeks on the job followed 
by rigorous testing.89  
Many cultural, political, and socioeconomic variables may impact a BDOs’ 
biases, and they need to be aware of the variables, as well as their own natural 
responses to them, versus their required professional response. In fact, BDOs, 
as well as all human beings, are susceptible to allowing their own biases to 
override or influence professional decisions. As BDOs have been criticized for 
88 Office of Inspector General, Transportation Security Administration’s Screening of 
Passengers by Observation Techniques (Redacted), 9. 
89 Ibid. 
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profiling in the past,90 these biases and responses require thorough 
understanding; training in these areas can help ensure objectivity of passenger 
assessment.  
The BDOs may also be confused about their authority or lack thereof. 
Given that the BDOs single out passengers exhibiting deceptive behavior who 
may actually be a threat, the BDOs need to be well versed in what they can and 
cannot do or say. Recently, a selectee passenger traveling from Minneapolis St. 
Paul International Airport (MSP) to Denver International Airport (DEN) was not 
given “enhanced” screening before departing MSP (although he did go through 
standard screening). He was met by a cadre of BDOs who were tasked with re-
screening him at his destination. The passenger was understandably resistant to 
being screened AFTER his flight, and the BDOs appeared unsure how to handle 
his questions and refusal to be rescreened.91 The BDO’s response to the 
passenger’s questions indicated that they were unsure of the authority (or in this 
case lack thereof, as the ATSA requires screening prior to boarding92) under 
which they were operating, and likely had not been trained on how to handle a 
situation effectively in which the passenger refuses to cooperate. The default 
response seems to be to call a supervisor, and the event revealed a gaping hole 
in the knowledge of BDO authorities.  
4. Effectiveness and Performance Testing 
One of the keys to success for any program is to be able to prove and 
track effectiveness. SPOT has difficulty with this task for several reasons that 
include not being able to measure deterrence or prove the negative (of how 
many deceptive passengers were missed if any), limited terrorist activity with 
90 Mark Hanrahan, “Logan Airport Racial Profiling Allegations: TSA Officers Complain 
Colleagues Are Targeting Minorities,” The Huffington Post, August 12, 2012, http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/12/logan-airport-racial-profiling_n_1769648.html.  
91 Barry Donegan, “TSA Tries to Pat Down Man After His Flight, Watch Him Refuse,” Ben 
Swann Truth In Media, September 12, 2014, http://benswann.com/tsa-tries-to-pat-down-man-
after-his-flight-watch-him-refuse/. 
92 “Screening Passengers and Property,” https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/assets/pdf/ 
49_usc_chapters_401_to_501.pdf.  
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which to verify effectiveness, unwillingness of critics to accept identifying 
criminals as a proxy for identifying terrorists, and limited methods to test 
effectiveness as true behavioral indicators cannot be replicated without the true 
fear of consequence. Other programs, such as technology programs, can have 
documented pass/fail testing protocols based on strict criteria or requirements set 
by the federal government prior to purchasing a piece of security equipment. A 
piece of technology generally has a target detection rate (of the specified subject 
matter) and a target false alarm rate to maintain a specified level of effectiveness 
without losing efficiency. These requirements are easy to test and can be 
“certified” in a lab environment by going through the checklist and ensuring all the 
technical requirements were met. Behavior detection cannot be tested with these 
traditional methods, as no detection requirements or false alarm requirements 
exist to measure against, and lab testing is unable to replicate the human 
emotion associated with high-stakes deception. This layer cannot be measured 
using traditional means, and lab testing is unable to replicate the type of human 
(subject) response that would be present in a real-world, high-stakes scenario, 
such as smuggling a bomb through the checkpoint.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. UTILIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS  
• Recommendation—Utilization: Perform human factors evaluation of 
high performing interview officers to determine which psychometric 
attributes consistently appear. Open hiring to general public, using 
these attributes as core competencies for BDO hiring.  
A key to the success of the TSA’s controversial SPOT program is to 
ensure that the workforce is comprised of the best possible candidates, ideally 
with aptitude for the task. A 2008 study on deception detection noted that the 
average person is slightly better than random at identifying when a person is 
lying or trying to deceive.93 However, the study also identified several groups that 
were much better at detecting deception than the average person. The groups 
included therapists, Secret Service agents, and other law enforcement types. 
The Secret Service agents were among the highest performing, presumably 
because of their training on scanning large crowds for non-verbal cues (similar to 
a BDO’s function at an airport), and the low frequency of uncovering a plot or 
perpetrator (not predisposed to assuming a crime has been committed).94 
Although other types of law enforcement did well, the commonality of frequently 
dealing with criminals may predispose them to a higher instance of type 1 errors 
(false positives). The study also noted that certain individuals had a “genius-
level” aptitude for detecting deception, which indicated the need to identify their 
common characteristics and use them to develop specific core competencies to 
be used as BDO qualifications.95  
The TSA should conduct human factors aptitude research to include 
psychometric testing (using industry recognized methods, such as Myers-Briggs 
or similar) to determine which traits occur most frequently in highly skilled 
93 Frank, Menasco, and O’Sullivan, “Human Behavior and Deception Detection,” 5, sec. 2.  
94 Ibid., 5–6, sec. 2.1. 
95 Ibid., 6, sec. 2.2. 
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behavior assessment officers (not limited to the TSA BDOs, but should include 
officers from other government agencies or industries using similar techniques). 
For example, a Meyers-Briggs assessment measures psychological preferences 
in the form of four dichotomies: extraversion/introversion, sensing/intuition, 
thinking/feeling, and judging/perceiving to come up with a personality type.96 As 
an experiment, the TSA’s human factors branch could select high performing 
BDOs (using some form of logical performance data as criteria, such as referral 
to arrest ratio) and administer the Meyers Briggs to determine what patterns are 
consistent in the psychological predispositions of high performing BDOs. If 
patterns emerge (such as strong marks toward sensing versus intuition, or 
thinking versus feeling), then the TSA can incorporate them into hiring criteria, or 
use it as a basis for further research or even custom aptitude test development. 
Additionally, a 2012 study in the Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology 
notes that research suggests certain characteristics, such as age, 
profession/experience, and handedness/hemispheric dominance, can play a role 
in deception detection aptitude.97 Attempting to find the most appropriate 
candidate for a job is not a new concept. The Department of Defense uses their 
armed forces vocational aptitude battery (ASVAB) to determine the vocational 
aptitude for new military recruits.98 While a basic aptitude test, the TSA should 
consider a similar model to find the best possible candidates for SPOT. 
Candidate selection is a key element for the effectiveness and consistency of the 
program moving forward, and finding candidates with appropriate aptitude should 
be a priority for the TSA. Hiring best qualified/prepared applicants based on 
psychometric assessment of aptitude and scientifically proven core 
competencies also provide much needed defensibility and credibility to the 
program, which is a major shift in strategic hiring practices for the TSA, and will 
96 “ MBTI® Basics,” accessed October 8, 2014, http://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-
personality-type/mbti-basics/.  
97 Shaw, Porter, and Brinke, “Catching Liars: Training Mental Health and Legal Professionals 
to Detect High-stakes Lies,” 2. 
98 “ASVAB Test Explained,” accessed November 15, 2014, http://www.military.com/join-
armed-forces/asvab/asvab-test-explained.html.  
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likely be met with many hurdles, including union pushback. However, the TSA 
must be committed to solving the hard problems if it wants to maintain this layer 
of security.  
• Recommendation—Utilization: Place additional hiring emphasis on 
candidates possessing program-enhancing characteristics, such as 
language skills and cultural competency/background.  
Diversity many times plays only a political role in the workplace, in which 
employers check the box that they met their Equal Employment Opportunity 
(EEO) and affirmative action quotas. However, following the intent of diversity 
rather than the letter of diversity can actually improve the performance of the 
organization by moving them a step closer to cultural competency. Cultural 
competency refers more to the cognitive state of organizations, and how they 
view and react to the different cultures in their communities (keeping in mind 
culture is not limited to race, and also includes other elements, such as belief 
systems and other social identity markers). Cultural competency is one of the 
most important factors for success in this globalized society, whether it is to 
better expand the customer base to improve the bottom line, or for the fire 
service to know that Somalis maintain numerous generations in a single 
household. In either case, understanding the “community” of interest provides 
valuable information. Particularly in the security, health, law enforcement, fire 
services, and other community services, this competency can even save lives.  
The Georgetown’s National Center for Cultural Competence provides a 
conceptual framework for culturally competent organizations, which includes 
acquiring and institutionalizing cultural knowledge, and adapting to the diversity 
and cultural context of the communities they serve.99 This same competency 
should exist within the BDO ranks according to the community needs and 
breakdown of the airport’s traveling community. The traveling community is not 
always simply the areas surrounding the airport, but refers to the cultural 
99 Georgetown University for Child and Human Development, “Conceptual 
Frameworks/Models, Guiding Values and Principles,” accessed November 15, 2014, 
http://nccc.georgetown.edu/foundations/frameworks.html#ccdefinition. 
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breakdown of the traveling population frequenting the airport. In the aviation 
security industry a popular expression is, “if you’ve seen one airport, you’ve seen 
one airport.” The statement embodies the idea expressed in this thesis, as each 
airport has its own set of unique circumstances including its specific trend of 
diversity from the traveling community, and the hiring selections should reflect 
the needs of the traveling community on a per airport basis. For example, 
airports in south Florida should have a high concentration of Latino BDOs, as 
well as a gender breakdown similar to the traveling community. The Latino BDO 
concentration is necessary not only because of the Latino demographic in south 
Florida, but also because many of the airports in south Florida fly to Latin 
American countries. In this case, both the local and the traveling communities 
have a high Latino concentration. While a simple example, each airport would 
need to consider its unique circumstances and build a BDO workforce according 
to the needs of its own traveling community. It is not necessary for every BDO to 
speak Spanish in Florida; that would be an extreme interpretation. The idea is 
that assets are available that have knowledge of additional languages, religions, 
ethnic background, etc., to build true cultural competency in the BDO ranks. 
Cultural competency is a buzzword typically used in a training context, in which 
organizations (particularly other public service organizations) pile diversity 
information on their existing workforce and expect them to become “competent” 
based on that training. While training in this area can be valuable, this study is 
suggesting that the TSA take that concept a step further by building a culturally 
competent baseline by making an effort to hire from within the communities that 
the TSA protects. Bureaucracy often prevents government leaders from making 
innovative decisions, and will require commitment from leadership to achieve the 
extensive modification to hiring practices.  
• Recommendation—Utilization: Create “peak time” BDO position to 
ensure BDOs are available during the busiest airport traffic hours.  
In the 2010 GAO audit, Dr. Paul Ekman (a major contributor to TSA’s 
development of SPOT) indicated that fatigue is a well-known issue amongst 
workers whose job requires intense observation and focus. He recommends 
 68 
ongoing research to determine the duration of effective observation.100 While an 
important recommendation that TSA should consider, fatigue could also be 
addressed through a strategic shift to hire part time BDOs. 
The concept and practice of using peak time employees is frequently used 
in other industries, such as banking, where the bank needs more staff during 
peak times than they have full time equivalent (FTE). Rather than carry additional 
FTE, banks will hire peak time tellers to fulfill the need during the rush, but not 
have to pay additional staff to sit around during off peak hours (utilization 
problem).  
Most airports operate in a peak time fashion during which the majority of 
their passengers leave on certain days and during certain hours. For example, 
Monday mornings and Friday afternoons typically see the highest volume of 
passenger due to business travelers commuting to and from work. Generally 
speaking, the majority of Monday morning passengers will arrive at the airport 
between 5:30 am and 8:30 am, which creates a large influx of passengers for 
about three hours. Hiring part-time BDOs for these peak shifts will allow the TSA 
to reduce their FTE BDO count and reduce the fatigue factor of BDOs by limiting 
the amount of time they must be engaged. Using BDOs when and where they will 
have the most impact also aligns with TSA’s new risk-based approach to aviation 
security. Alternatively, to retain high performing BDOs who need full time 
employment, SPOT could be made a collateral duty utilized during peak times, 
with the officer conducting normal screening operations at off-peak times. In 
either case, the TSA should consider the five factors influencing travel patterns 
(day, time, season, holiday, and destination)101 when determining how to best 
provide behavior detection at the most effective times while maintaining an 
efficient workforce. A peak-time or collateral work schedule that mirrors peak 
100 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security, Efforts to Validate TSA’s 
Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to 
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges. 
101 Ed Hewitt, “A Peek at Peak Travel,” IndependentTraveler.com, accessed October 8, 
2014, http://www.independenttraveler.com/travel-tips/travelers-ed/a-peek-at-peak-travel.  
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airport times/seasons will provide the best combination of coverage and 
efficiency. Generally speaking, if normal SPOT coverage is 16 hours per day 
(assuming 1,500 BDOs per shift, and two shifts), and peak travel time is only six 
hours a day (assuming three hours in the AM and three hours in the PM), the 
SPOT program could cut man-hours by more than half. The assumptions in this 
exemplar are quite conservative, since in reality, peak hours are not consistent 
on a daily basis and only apply to the busiest travel days. In actuality, the TSA 
could consider a SPOT skeleton crew on non-peak days and seasons, to “right 
size” the SPOT FTE count, or reassign the BDOs to other duties during this time 
to minimize the SPOT hourly cost. Of course, it is a general discussion of the 
efficiencies to be gained and variances will occur among individual airports 
according to layout, checkpoint design, seasonality, etc., but the concept of peak 
time BDO will save thousands of man hours per day, and will allow the TSA to 
streamline the SPOT budget while still adding maximum security value. This 
practice would also improve the effectiveness of the program by limiting the 
duration of the task (with high cognitive load), which would presumably allow the 
BDOs to perform at a higher level during their limited shift. Additionally, the pool 
of applicants may be increased to include retired military or law enforcement 
officers who may already possess some aptitude but do not desire to work full 
time. Lastly, having the skillset of an “off-duty” SPOT officer imbedded in normal 
screening procedures during off peak times only improves the capabilities at the 
checkpoint. The peak time BDO concept also improves defensibility for the TSA, 
as it is able to allocate resources more efficiently and save taxpayer dollars by 
reducing dependency on FTE BDOs.  
Of course, this concept is not without challenges, such as maintaining 
training or proficiency of a peak-time or part-time BDO. However, the seemingly 
erratic nature of air travel actually follows predictable trends, which allows the 
TSA to determine what a seasonal or peak-time schedule might look like. Once 
these patterns are established, the TSA can build in appropriate job performance 
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standards to include skill maintenance, refresher training, and continuing 
education for the peak-time/part-time population.  
B. TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS  
• Recommendation—Training: Merge TSA developed BDO training 
with FLETC developed and administered training to provide a 
stronger baseline to the BDOs. Recommend FLETC behavioral 
science division review TSA training materials to determine whether 
the BDOs can simply attend an interview course, or if FLETC can 
modify interview courses to accommodate the BDOs.  
According to TSA Deputy Administrator John Halinski, the TSA is in the 
process of centralizing most of their training into the Office of Training and 
Workforce Engagement (OTWE) to maintain and enhance the capabilities of TSA 
employees while providing a consistent training experience.102 To accomplish 
this goal, in April 2012, the TSA established a training presence at DHS’s FLETC 
in Glynco, Georgia. Although a component of the DHS, FLETC is an inter-agency 
training organization that has trained more than 1,000,000 law enforcement 
officers from 91 different government agencies or partner organizations.103 
FLETC’s approach to instruction is to maintain “a mix of permanent, detailed, and 
recently retired staff (to) provide an appropriate balance of training expertise, 
recent operational experience, and fresh insight from the field.”104 Not 
surprisingly, FLETC maintains a behavioral science division responsible for 
designing and administering courses in the many aspects of human behavior. 
One of the principal topics it addresses is interview skills for criminal investigators 
and law enforcement officers. Of the topics covered in these classes, several 
would be directly applicable to the BDO position including interviewing strength 
and weakness forum, eye accessing cues and behavioral baselines, question 
102 Written testimony of Transportation Security Administration Deputy Administrator John 
Halinski for a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security 
hearing titled “Eleven Years After 9/11 Can TSA Evolve To Meet the Next Terrorist Threat?,” 
112th Cong. (2012). 
103 “Welcome to FLETC,” accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.fletc.gov/.  
104 Ibid. 
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types to elicit admissions, subject elimination interviews (ruling out a threat), and 
cognitive interviews. While it will require dedication to collaboration, it fits 
perfectly into the TSA training strategy of providing a consistent professional 
experience to all TSA employees. The TSA will need to consider whether the 
entire training can be done at FLETC, or if it will still need a small course focused 
on CONOPS to be taught locally. Either way, the TSA can address some of the 
GAO and OIG’s valid complaints regarding underperforming instructors and 
inconsistent BDO performance across the country. Additionally, the TSA will be 
able to leverage existing instructional design and instructor expertise on the topic 
while potentially building a new course that may be desirable to other agencies or 
countries. This strategic shift has other intangible benefits as well, such as 
creating an esprit de corps and sense of camaraderie amongst the workforce. It 
is no coincidence that the members of the armed forces have all attended a 
“basic training” after which their sense of accomplishment bonds them together 
and creates a sense of pride. The TSA can improve the effectiveness of the 
program by providing a more consistent training experience administered by 
professional instructors and practitioners at a highly respected educational 
institution. Leveraging the expertise and reputation of FLETC’s 40-year law 
enforcement training heritage also provides credibility and defensibility to the 
program, as FLETC’s credentials have never been in question. Additionally, the 
TSA may be able to re-focus existing BDO instructors by assigning them the 
lower-skill tasks of providing local update training or facilitating continuing 
education as necessary. While a major strategic shift for the SPOT program, it 
coincides perfectly with the agencies new effort to centralize training for 
consistency, while leveraging existing government resources.  
• Recommendation—Training: Add content to the basic BDO training 
to include understanding the authority under which they operate, 
cultural, political, and socioeconomic variables that affect a 
person’s behavior; and how personal biases affect a BDO’s 
response to those variables. 
The inadequacy of training content mentioned in “weaknesses” refers to 
providing information about why the BDOs are required to do certain things. It is 
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strategic shift in training, as most TSA training is technical in nature and focuses 
on operations, such as what buttons to push and how to start up or shut down a 
system. The BDOs, however, are not pushing buttons and deciphering colors on 
an X-ray screen; their job is much more about psychology and understanding 
people and their normal behaviors in an airport environment. This type of skill 
cannot be taught with simple operational techniques, but rather needs to be 
taught from a perspective of understanding.  
For example, recent events (the Denver incident mentioned earlier) have 
shown that the BDOs are often tasked to do things that might be outside their 
authority, or at least they may not know if they have the authority to do what they 
are doing. For instance, during the passenger re-screening incident in Denver, 
the passenger asked several times if he was being detained or arrested, and 
whether he was required by law to submit to the re-screening even though he 
had already reached his destination. The BDO in charge should have had clear 
answers to those questions, for himself as much as the passenger. If the BDO 
had been trained properly on what authority he was operating under, he would 
have known that chapter 449 of Title 49 C.F.R states, “…screening for domestic 
flights shall take place before boarding…” and that the TSA may not have had 
legal authority to rescreen that passenger after his flight had landed. 
Furthermore, the BDO was unable to discuss the concepts of legal detention 
versus arrest, neither of which was within his authority, which is a failure of 
training on the part of the SPOT program, and not specific to this individual BDO.  
Understanding how cultural, political, and socioeconomic variables impact 
passengers’ appearance, behavior, and response to questioning, should be a 
major focus of SPOT training. While the BDOs will learn through experience over 
time what the specific cultures and reactions are at their airport, a strong baseline 
in cultural competency would be beneficial. One way to identify the differences 
between people and their behaviors is to understand the similarities. As an 
example of improving training content, the BDOs curriculum could focus on basic 
physiological/psychological elements, such as the six universal emotions as 
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described by Dr. Paul Ekman. Dr. Ekman contends that all cultures respond 
similarly to the same basic human emotions, with the big six being anger, 
happiness, surprise, disgust, sadness, and fear (see Figure 5).105 An 
understanding of what all cultures have in common provides a valuable baseline 
for performing BDO duties.  
 
Figure 5.  Six Universal Emotions106 
Along with understanding universal emotions, additional discussion and 
content related to the cognitive biases that all humans are subject to, and how 
that may impact a BDO’s work should happen. In particular, some understanding 
105 Paul Ekman, “Are There Basic Emotions,” Psychological Review 99, no. 3 (February 10, 
1991), http://www.communicationcache.com/uploads/1/0/8/8/10887248/are_there_basic_emot 
ions.pdf.  
106 “Six Basic Emotions,” June 26, 2013, https://managementmania.com/en/six-basic-
emotions.  
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of confirmation bias, in-group bias, and observational selection bias would be 
beneficial. Confirmation bias generally means that people agree with people that 
agree with them, and in the case of a BDO, can lead to discriminatory reactions 
against misunderstood groups, which may then lead to profiling or the 
appearance of profiling.107 Similarly, in-group bias (also called in-group 
favoritism), showing preference to a group sharing values, culture, interests, etc., 
and separating groups into “we and they” can affect BDOs’ evaluation of 
individuals they do not identify with, which can lead to prejudice during their 
interaction.108 Being aware of this and other types of group biases will help the 
BDO population make impartial decisions when dealing with a wide variety of 
“groups.” Another bias to be aware of is observational selection. Sometimes an 
event like purchasing a new car can trigger a person’s brain to start noticing the 
exact same car frequently. Observational selection bias makes it possible to 
believe that these cars have just begun appearing, when in reality, they have 
always been present, but had not been noticed prior to the purchase of the car. 
Similarly, a BDO who successfully identifies a criminal or terrorist may start to 
believe that their frequency of arrival is increasing, or worse yet, it may lead them 
also to impose out-group status to an entire religion, race, or group based on the 
discovery of one criminal or person with malintent. Cognitive bias is a major 
contributor to the failure of human based assessments, and the more aware the 
BDOs are of these biases and how to combat them, the less chance exists for 
profiling (even inadvertently) certain groups of people. This bias has to be 
balanced with data, as well. For example, a high percentage of Muslims being 
selected by the BDOs for additional screening at a Chicago airport does not 
necessarily indicate profiling as ~2.8 percent of the population in Illinois is 
107 Raymond S. Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,” 
Review of General Psychology 2, no. 2 (December 18, 1997): 175, http://psy2.ucsd.edu/~mcken 
zie/nickersonConfirmationBias.pdf.  
108 Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio, Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common 
Ingroup Identity Model (Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press, 2000), 5. 
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Muslim.109 Further, the traveling population from Chicago airports could have an 
even higher Muslim population. Local TSA needs to be fully aware of the airport’s 
traveling population and understand how the correlations between population 
breakdown and arrests, as well as other factors that influence which groups are 
selected for secondary screening most frequently, such as non-English speakers 
not understanding the restrictions at the airport.  
Many cognitive biases occur, and the need for highly specialized, robust 
training is obvious when considering the legal issues, cognitive biases, and the 
variety of group variables faced by a BDO. As previously mentioned, this training 
is also best given to only persons with aptitude for this job requiring high 
cognitive function, the ability to minimize biases, and understand the local 
passenger population culture. 
• Recommendation—Training: Offer advanced training classes in 
areas that will add value add at the checkpoint, as well as offer 
career advancement opportunities for the BDOs (by collecting and 
demonstrating proficiency in advanced training areas).  
As previously mentioned, the BDO community is sometimes considered to 
be “standing around” and not assisting with passenger processing at the 
checkpoint. While technically just a perception issue, they should be capable of 
multitasking even if they are not assisting the checkpoint with processing 
passengers. A concept that would add value to the BDO program would be to 
have BDOs competent in advanced skills that could benefit not only the 
checkpoint but also the entire airport. For example, a BDO could elect or earn the 
opportunity to obtain first responder certification, cardiac pulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR) certification, “active shooter” certification, etc., to possibly even include a 
law enforcement status (of course, it would require reclassification).  
This recommendation crosses over a couple of different weaknesses 
including training and utilization, but offers a strategic improvement to capability, 
109 Jahnabi Barooah, “Most and Least Muslim States in America (PHOTOS),” The 
Huffington Post, June 27, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/most-and-least-
muslim-states_n_1626144.html.  
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perception, and effectiveness for the program. On November 1, 2013, a lone 
gunman walked into terminal three at LAX and opened fire, and eventually killed 
one TSA officer and wounded two others.110 In this instance, it would have been 
beneficial for TSA BDOs to have any of the advanced skills mentioned above. 
The recommendation is not suggesting that the BDO receive a 10-minute on-line 
course about CPR or active shooters, but be selected for advanced training in 
these areas based on performance/capability. While not only a training 
recommendation, it is also a CONOPS career progression recommendation, 
where being selected for, and obtaining any of these advanced training 
certificates will allow the BDOs to advance in their career or obtain additional pay 
for the additional skills obtained. Per previous recommendations, much of this 
information can be taught at FLETC using existing curriculum and courses. Much 
discussion of how the BDOs could have helped during the LAX shooting has 
occurred, including recommendations offered by the TSA and GAO during the 
November 14th hearing before the House of Representatives subcommittee on 
Transportation Security, and by the Los Angeles World Airport Police in their 
March 2014 after action report.111 The recommendations include operational 
issues, such as improving communications, having more police on site, and 
using CCTV. All good recommendations, but none take advantage of an already 
present workforce (the BDOs) frequently putting themselves in harm’s way by 
singling out suspicious individuals. Training these employees (assuming it is 
possible to ensure this workforce is the “right” workforce) is a great opportunity to 
enhance security at the checkpoint, as well as the value of the SPOT program. It 
is difficult to rely on emergency services or tactical response when they are 
110 CBS/AP, “LAX Shooting Kills TSA Officer, Wounds Others,” CBSNews, November 1, 
2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lax-shooting-kills-tsa-officer-wounds-others/.  
111 Written testimony of TSA Administrator John Pistole for a House Committee on 
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security hearing titled “TSA’s SPOT 
Program and Initial Lessons From the LAX Shooting,” 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of John 
Pistole), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg87373/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg87373.pdf; Los 
Angeles World Airport Police, “Active Shooter Incident and Resulting Airport Disruption, A Review 
of Response Opeations,” March 14, 2014, http://www.lawa.org/uploadedFiles/LAXLAWA%20T 
3%20After%20Action%20Report%20March%2018%202014.pdf. 
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minutes away and hundreds of passenger’s lives may be at stake at the 
checkpoint area. Having the capability to respond to medical emergencies (as 
first responders) and other critical incidents up to and including a law 
enforcement type response is a strategic shift that the TSA should consider for 
SPOT. That is not to say that SPOT needs to convert into a combination fire 
department and police department, but that those capabilities can be strategically 
placed at checkpoints for a small portion of the workforce. This placement serves 
to improve capability and credibility of SPOT, as well as incentivize the workforce 
to perform well by providing a career progression. The previously mentioned 
examples of the BDOs responding to medical emergencies and criminal activity 
demonstrate that the BDOs are positioned (literally and figuratively) perfectly for 
these additional responsibilities, as they are already observing the area for 
anomalous behavior or activity, and are frequently engaging the public.  
C. EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE TESTING:  
• Recommendation—Performance: Collaborate with agencies 
training spy craft or undercover techniques to test the BDOs 
covertly or overtly.  
One principle noted by Frank, Menasco, and O’Sullivan is that detecting 
the behavioral indicators is easier when the stakes or consequences are 
higher.112 This principle could indicate that behavior detection in a security or 
criminal type environment will be more effective than in, for example, a 
therapist’s office or academic study. It may also indicate that the SPOT 
program’s effectiveness in identifying criminals and criminal activity does 
correlate to the effectiveness of identifying a terrorist who would be experiencing 
similar reactions to the fear of being caught in a high consequence scenario. 
Therefore, it is possible to test the effectiveness of the program (or a single BDO) 
if the TSA can provide controlled test subjects who truly do have a fear of being 
discovered due to an actual consequence. Other agencies, such as the CIA, ATF 
112 Frank, Menasco, and O’Sullivan, “Human Behavior and Deception Detection,” 6, sec. 
2.2. 
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and FBI, train their agents in espionage and undercover techniques including the 
art of deception. For this training to be effective, the tester needs to face a real 
consequence, incentive, or motivation, such as fear of dismissal or remediation. 
For this reason, it is recommended that the TSA work with these agencies during 
their agent’s training phases, during which the trainee must avoid BDO detection 
to pass a class or move to the next phase of his or her training. This testing will 
not only provide a true test for a BDO, but also provide valuable feedback on the 
agencies’ training candidate. This concept would improve effectiveness for SPOT 
by actually measuring effectiveness and identifying areas for improvement. The 
concept also improves defensibility for the program by providing actual 
performance data, which is also crucial to the cost-benefit analysis requested by 
both the GAO and OIG. This recommendation is based on inter-agency 
collaboration and resource leveraging to improve efficiency and provide a benefit 
for multiple agencies, which should be undertaken under the watch of human 
experts to ensure this type of incentivized testing will yield relative effectiveness 
data. Keep in mind that even these incentivized testers will not have their very life 
at stake, as would a suicide terrorist. This cross-pollination effort should address 
every aspect of SPOT including appearance, behavior, response to questioning, 
etc., so as not to not replicate an already flawed version of “interview testing,” as 
described in the numerous deception detection meta-analyses. Ideally, if this 
method proves to be viable, it should also be capable of producing the number of 
negatives (missed adversaries), as well as provide insight into the most 
functional CONOPS for assessing the most passengers. 
• Recommendation—Performance: Establish an operational baseline 
performance metric for existing BDOs using arrests/prohibited item 
to referral ratio.  
While the agency collaboration and incentivized testing solution is likely a 
long-term and complex undertaking, the TSA could begin baseline performance 
for BDOs using existing metrics in a variety of ways. During the SPOT validation 
study, the DHS used the outcome to referral ratio to compare SPOT performance 
to random selection of passengers for interview, for which the outcome was the 
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combined number of arrests and dangerous prohibited items confiscated. The 
TSA can use this same methodology to compare the performance of all existing 
BDOs to start the process of establishing a baseline for BDO performance. 
Calculating the rate at which a BDO referral is found to be in possession of a 
serious prohibited item, or arrested by a LEO, is truly indicative of how well a 
BDO separates passengers into their respective risk categories. While existing 
data is not available to determine what percentage a BDO should be able to 
achieve, the comparative analysis of the BDOs will provide a range of TSA BDO 
capabilities, with a higher ratio indicating higher performance. Based on the 
capabilities achieved and the variance amongst the BDOs, the TSA will be able 
to establish a minimum requirement for this ratio and use that requirement as a 
baseline performance metric that the BDOs will need to achieve to maintain BDO 
status. This method will create new complications, but using a ratio allows the 
TSA to obtain relevant data from all BDOs regardless of their airport 
circumstances (i.e., high referral airports can still be compared to low referral 
airports). More investigation is needed to determine if operational, incentivized 
testing will also be useful; however, in the meantime, this metric can be 
established immediately, and followed by analysis to determine an appropriate 
range for the ratio. The value in this metric is also in the TSA holding itself 
accountable for performance, and being able to report that the BDOs must 
maintain “X” ratio of accuracy in deception judgments based on their referral to 
outcome ratio. This particular metric is low hanging fruit for the TSA, and analysis 
should begin immediately to find the baseline ratios for individual BDOs, as well 
as the program itself. The TSA cannot take this task lightly, as the follow on 
tasking, creating and holding the workforce to a minimum ratio, is a strategic shift 
and must result in the elimination of the BDOs unable to maintain an acceptable 
ratio. This task should be undertaken simultaneously with other 
recommendations, so that by the time a baseline is determined, it will be also be 
known what characteristics make a good BDO, and potentially, whether the 
improved content and consistency of training can improve the performance of 
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lower performing BDOs who may otherwise be eliminated. The TSA will need to 
sort the details of accountability, associated minimums outputs if any (such as a 
minimum number of referrals), probationary periods, remediation or mentorship 
as necessary, etc. Sorting these issues is trivial compared to the strategic and 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The TSA SPOT program must continue to evolve, as it is one of the few 
layers that provide a real time threat assessment outside of the known 
technology countermeasures. Adversaries are constantly studying the TSA’s 
countermeasures and are exploring mechanisms and concealment techniques to 
defeat them; however, it is far more difficult for terrorists to conceal their 
involuntary emotional, physiological, and physical responses that will occur while 
engaged in high-stakes deception. While the TSA should continue to pursue the 
basic corrective action needed to fulfill the GAO and OIG recommendations, it 
should also be considering the strategic direction of the SPOT program, including 
how to improve effectiveness and defensibility to make SPOT a legitimate, 
contributing, aviation security program. Considering creative solutions to complex 
problems aligns with the TSA’s commitment to becoming a high performing 
organization.113  
This most revealing part of this study is the inconclusive and controversial 
nature of the academic literature in this field. Essentially, no literature evaluating 
behavior detection in totality is available; the majority of the literature focuses on 
lie detection in an interview setting, or deception detecting with similar 
experiment conditions. Additionally, this study finds the academic literature in this 
field to be too dependent on studies using only trivial lies and unmotivated lie 
tellers as experiment conditions and test participants. Conclusions about SPOT 
should not be drawn from academic research relying on these conditions.  
While this field of study collectively acknowledges the limitations of the 
experiment conditions, more research in the field of high-stakes lies and 
deception detection in an airport environment is needed to make conclusive 
claims about TSA SPOT. Areas in which the literature is in general agreement 
113 Eleven Years After 9/11 Can TSA Evolve To Meet the Next Terrorist Threat?: Hearing 
before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Transportation Security. 
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are: 1) verbal and non-verbal cues to deception do exist, 2) no “Pinocchio’s nose” 
telltale indicator of deception exists, 3) deception can be easier or more difficult 
to detect depending on the skill of the liar, 4) high-stakes lies may be easier to 
detect than trivial lies due to the powerful emotions associated with a motivated 
lie, 5) cues to deception may be more evident during personal lies, and 6) lie 
catchers can be trained to elicit indicators from liars by increasing their cognitive 
load.  
This study concludes that SPOT is a valuable layer of aviation security, 
but needs to be evolving with the academic research and enhancing their 
capabilities as more is learned about the science. The GAO, OIG, and now this 
thesis, have analyzed SPOT with similar findings. The strategic shifts 
recommended in this thesis align with the TSA’s current efforts to become a 
more effective and efficient organization, and are intended to address the 
strategic gaps of the program. The TSA should consider major changes to SPOT 
to improve the security value and provide credibility and defensibility to this 
misunderstood program. A summary of the recommendations is provided as 
follows.  
• Establish an operational baseline performance metric for existing 
BDOs using arrests/prohibited item to referral ratio.  
• Develop hiring criteria based on a study of psychometric and other 
attributes of high performing BDOs.  
• Place additional hiring emphasis on candidates possessing 
program-enhancing characteristics, such as language skills and 
cultural competency/background.  
• Conduct all SPOT training at FLETC using established procedures.  
• Revise SPOT curriculum to include explanation of TSA authority, 
cultural, political, and socioeconomic variables that affect a 
person’s behavior, and how personal biases affect response to 
those variables. 
• Offer advanced training classes in areas that will add value at the 
checkpoint, as well as offer career advancement opportunities for 
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the BDOs (by collecting and demonstrating proficiency in advanced 
training areas).  
• Collaborate with agencies training spy craft or undercover 
techniques to test BDOs covertly or overtly.  
It is imperative that the TSA continue to develop the SPOT program to 
maintain a threat agnostic and unpredictable layer difficult for adversaries to 
“game.” The SPOT program also provides a level of deterrence that would be 
lost if the program were defunded or minimized. Addressing strategic items, such 
as performance metrics, candidate selection, utilization, and training consistency, 
will not only appease political sensitivities, but also improve the security value of 
the program. While the TSA is making progress on some of the operational GAO 
recommendations, it should consider the recommendations in this thesis to 
provide direction and long-term stability for SPOT.  
Additionally, areas for future research that may provide valuable strategic 
direction to TSA SPOT and other anti-terrorism countermeasures include: 
• Creating measurable metrics for deterrence—Deterrence is a 
main goal of terrorism countermeasures but is not typically included 
in strategic plans as a measurable metric or outcome. 
Understanding deterrence may help organizations determine when 
to shift countermeasures, and when a countermeasure can be 
deescalated.  
• Developing alternative CONOPS—TSA may want to explore 
alternative CONOPS to address some of the operational issues. 
For example, developing a cadre of LEO BDOs may alleviate the 
current LEO response issues, and may be a more viable concept 
for intentionally interacting with higher-risk individuals. Conversely, 
training everyone in behavior detection techniques may provide 
additional coverage in order to evaluate more passengers with 
these methods.  
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